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Abstract:
My dissertation comprises two chapters. The first chapter examines the informa-
tion content of actual share repurchase within the context of informed options trading,
while the second chapter examines the impact of EPS-motivated share repurchase on
stock price crash risk.
The first chapter studies the information content of actual share repurchase within
the context of informed options trading. I find that pre-repurchase options tradings
complement the information conveyed by actual repurchases, and predict higher and
more volatile stock return and operating performance. The pre-repurchase use of
bullish directional strategy (measured by call options to stock volume ratio) pre-
dicts higher abnormal return and operating performance; the pre-repurchase use of
volatility strategy (measured by at-the-money options to stock volume ratio) pre-
dicts higher abnormal volatility and operating performance volatility. Institutional
ownership mitigates the information asymmetry of pre-repurchase options trading.
The second chapter investigates whether EPS-motivated share repurchase affects
stock price crash risk. This study finds that firms with a higher level of EPS-motivated
share repurchase are associated with higher ex-ante (expected) crash risk. Stock liq-
uidity reduces repurchase cost and further increases the expected crash risk. Insti-
tutional ownership and analyst coverage discipline managers from conducting EPS-
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CHAPTER I
DOES OPTIONS TRADING COMPLEMENT INFORMATION
CONVEYED BY SUBSEQUENT STOCK REPURCHASE ACTIVITY?
1. Inroduction
The last three decades have witnessed a dramatic increase in the use of open market
share repurchase since the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted Rule
10b-18 in 1984, and the total value of share repurchases (led by open market share
repurchase) exceeded that of dividends in 2000 (Grullon and Michaely, 2002). Accord-
ing to the survey evidence in Brav et al. (2005), many managers favor repurchases
because repurchases are viewed as being more flexible than dividends. Specifically,
managers can decide if, when, and how many shares to buy back based on stock price
and free cash flow. Many motivations have been ascribed to repurchases (Dittmar,
2000; DeAngelo et al., 2009) ranging from signaling to tax/investor preference to
takeover defense to capital structure adjustment to equity compensation dilution.
Based on their extensive review, DeAngelo et al. (2009) favor an asymmetric infor-
mation framework where repurchase firms have superior information and can time
the market by buying back stocks when the shares are undervalued. In testing the
various theories, empirical research has largely focused on repurchase announcements.
However, recent evidence documents that firms do not always follow through on their
repurchase announcements.
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Evidence shows that on average, only 73 percent of announced shares are repurchased,
and in 9 percent of the cases firms do not buy any of the shares originally announced.
This calls into question the credibility and the nature of the information conveyed by buy-
back announcements. The focus instead should be on actual repurchases. Oded (2009)
constructs an optimal execution model of stock repurchase and proves that actual execu-
tions of repurchases convey information about the firm value, and traders can infer such
information from the actual repurchases. Bonaime and Ryngaert (2013) find that actual
share repurchases predict persistent positive abnormal returns, and that concurrent net
insider stock buyings complement the information conveyed by actual repurchases.
The current paper studies the information content of actual share repurchase within
the context of informed options trading. I find that pre-repurchase options tradings com-
plement the information conveyed by actual repurchases, and predict higher and more
volatile stock return and operating performance. Additionally, both stock and options
volumes are higher in pre-repurchase quarters, indicating the presence of informed trad-
ings. Consistent with the notion that informed traders prefer options over stock due
to the implicit leverage of options (Easley et al., 1998), options volume increases more
than stock volume does prior to actual repurchases. Moreover, the pre-repurchase use of
bullish directional strategy by options traders (measured by call options to stock volume
ratio) predicts higher post-repurchase abnormal return and operating performance. This
evidence suggests that actual repurchases and pre-repurchase options tradings convey
favorable complementary information about post-repurchase stock return and operating
performance. The pre-repurchase use of volatility strategy by options traders (measured
by at-the-money options to stock volume ratio) predicts higher post-repurchase stock
volatility and operating performance volatility. One possible reason for the increase in
firm risk is the increase in leverage caused by actual repurchases. Besides, I find that insti-
tutional holdings mitigate the information asymmetry of pre-repurchase options tradings.
These findings are robust to difference-in-difference analysis using 2003 Modification to
SEC Rule 10b-18 as an exogenous policy shock. A placebo test using random repurchase
2
quarters further validates my results.
I extend Bonaime and Ryngaert (2013) in four important aspects. First, I study not
only the stock returns but also the stock volatility after actual repurchases. Accord-
ing to Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996), repurchases are positively related to the stock
volatility, because higher stock volatility implies a higher likelihood of buying back the
stock at a lower price. Therefore, actual share repurchases convey information about
stock volatility. Second, I study not only the post-repurchase stock returns but also
the post-repurchase operating performances. Campbell and Shiller (1988) construct a
rational expectations model and proves that stock return and stock volatility depend
on the growth and volatility of future operating performance. Consequently, it is im-
portant to study both firm stock and firm operating performance. Third, I investigate
pre-repurchase options tradings instead of insider stock tradings. There are three main
advantages of using options tradings for the current study. First, like corporate insiders,
outsiders can have superior information as well, because some outsiders can obtain supe-
rior information from the insiders (Manove, 1989; Eyssell and Arshadi, 1993). Therefore,
using insider stock tradings as a proxy for informed tradings may underestimate the mag-
nitude of informed tradings. Second, options trading is more likely to be informed than
stock trading. Theoretical and empirical studies confirm that informed traders prefer op-
tions over stock due to the embedded leverage of options (Biais and Hillion, 1994; Easley
et al., 1998; Cao, 1999). Third, investigating options tradings allows me to disentangle
the information about the stock return from that about stock volatility. Specifically, a
trader may buy call (put) options if she predicts that the price of the underlying stock
will rise (fall); a trader may buy at-the-money options if she predicts that the volatility
of the underlying stock will rise. Consequently, by examining which types of options
are traded prior to actual repurchases, I can infer what options traders know about the
post-repurchase stock return and stock volatility.
The current paper also relates to the studies about informed options tradings prior to
corporate events, including analyst recommendations (Hayunga and Lung, 2014; Lin and
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Lu, 2015), merger and acquisition announcements (Cao et al., 2005; Jayaraman et al.,
2001; Augustin et al., 2015; Chan et al., 2015), earnings announcements (Jin et al., 2012),
dividend change announcements (Zhang, 2018), and repurchase announcements (Hao,
2016). These papers focus on how options tradings affect stock returns around corporate
events, while the current paper explores the information content of actual repurchase
in both the valuation dimension (stock return and operating performance) and the risk
dimension (stock volatility and operating performance volatility). Moreover, even though
the existing studies suggest that informed traders prefer options over stock, most do not
consider stock tradings when investigating options tradings. The current study uses OS,
the options to stock volume ratio, to explicitly account for the trading choice between
options and stock (Roll et al., 2010). More importantly, the current paper is the first
one to decompose the OS measure into components corresponding to the directional
strategy and volatility strategy that options traders may use. Besides, the current study
extends the literature about corporate governance by examining the role of institutional
ownership in mitigating the information asymmetry of options tradings prior to actual
repurchases.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature
and develops hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample and variables. Section 4 reports
the results. Section 5 addresses robustness concerns and Section 6 concludes.
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
Based on a sample of 185 announcements of open market share repurchase programs, Bar-
tov (1991) finds that analysts revise up earnings forecasts for announcing firms. Further,
the earnings of the announcing firms increase during the announcement year, suggesting
that repurchase announcements may convey favorable information about future oper-
ating performance. Using a much larger sample of 4,443 repurchase announcements,
Grullon and Michaely (2004) document positive abnormal returns following repurchase
announcements, indicating that investors perceive repurchase announcements as good
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news. Compared to dividends, repurchases are more flexible by design. Specifically,
actual repurchase quantities can differ substantially from announced amounts due to
fluctuations in stock prices and investment opportunities (Stephens and Weisbach, 1998;
Bonaime, 2012). Therefore, repurchase announcements may be considered “cheap talk”
without financial commitments. Lie (2005) examines the completion rates of repurchase
announcements, and finds that both the operating performance improvements and the
positive announcement abnormal returns are limited to the firms that buy back shares
during the announcement quarter. These findings suggest that actual repurchases may
convey more credible information than repurchase announcements. Therefore, the current
paper focuses on the information content of actual repurchases as opposed to repurchase
announcements.
The actual repurchase model of Oded (2009) demonstrates that when firms buy back
stocks on the open market, the actual executions will convey favorable information about
the firm value and drive up stock prices. This theoretical evidence, coupled with the
aforementioned empirical findings, suggests that actual repurchases may convey favorable
information about future stock return and operating performance.
According to the free cash flow hypothesis of payouts, it is optimal for a firm lacking
growth opportunity to distribute free cash flows to its stockholders. Therefore, payouts
induced by free cash flows should reduce the risk of negative-NPV investments, and thus
reduce the total risk of the firm. Grullon and Michaely (2002) and DeAngelo et al. (2006)
confirm the free cash flow hypothesis of payouts by showing that compared to young
firms, mature firms are more likely to pay dividends. However, more recent evidence
finds that an increasing number of US firms do not generate sufficient free cash flows to
fund their repurchases internally, but choose to raise capital to finance the repurchases
(Farre-Mensa et al., 2018). This evidence contradicts the free cash flow hypothesis that
assumes payouts should be funded by free cash flows. As a result, actual repurchases
may increase firm risk, because repurchases consume cash and increase leverage (Chen
and Wang, 2012). Since higher leverage is associated with higher risk, especially for
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financially constrained firms (Myers and Majluf, 1984), I argue that actual repurchases
convey information about higher firm risk. Further, this higher risk is reflected in higher
stock volatility and operating performance volatility following actual repurchases. Based
on these considerations, I propose the first hypothesis:
• H1a: Actual share repurchases are associated with higher post-repurchase stock
return and operating performance.
• H1b: Actual share repurchases are associated with higher post-repurchase stock
volatility and operating performance volatility.
Bonaime and Ryngaert (2013) find that insider stock buyings increase in repurchase
quarters, and net insider stock buyings are positively associated with post-repurchase
abnormal returns. This evidence indicates the presence of informed tradings around
actual repurchases, and suggests that the informed tradings may complement the infor-
mation conveyed by actual repurchases. Therefore, ignoring the informed tradings may
underestimate the information content of actual repurchases. Based on these consid-
erations, I examine the information content of actual repurchase within the context of
pre-repurchase informed tradings. Unlike Bonaime and Ryngaert (2013), I study the in-
formed tradings in pre-repurchase quarters instead of repurchase quarters, because some
tradings in the repurchase quarters may happen after actual repurchases and may not
be considered informed. Focusing on the pre-repurchase quarters allows me to have a
clear identification of informed tradings. Furthermore, I assess the information content
of actual repurchases in both the valuation dimension (stock return and operating per-
formance) and the risk dimension (stock volatility and operating performance volatility).
Specifically, I examine pre-repurchase options tradings instead of stock tradings mainly
because options tradings are more likely to be informed than stock tradings. Informed
traders prefer options over stock due to the implicit leverage of options (Easley et al.,
1998). Options are much cheaper than the underlying stocks, and the informed traders
can exploit this leverage effect to achieve higher returns. If trading costs (fees, commis-
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sions, taxes, liquidity costs, price impacts, etc.) were absent, informed traders would
trade options exclusively. However, options, on average, have higher trading costs than
stock. Therefore, the informed traders face a trade-off between the leverage effect of
options and the low trading costs of stock. When the informed traders migrate from
stock to options, the increased demand for options will drive up the options’ prices and
reduce the leverage effect. Additionally, the increase in options trading volume makes
it difficult for informed traders to hide their identity (Kyle, 1985). Consequently, the
informed traders will continue to migrate from stock to options until the benefits of the
leverage effect can no longer justify the increase in trading costs. When informed traders
are present, this mechanism will lead to an increase in both the stock volume and op-
tions volume, and the increase in the options volume will be larger than that in the stock
volume. Therefore, both the stock volume and options volume will rise prior to actual
repurchase, a corporate informational event. Following Roll et al. (2010), I define OS
as the options to stock volume ratio to account for the relative change in the options
volume and stock volume. OS explicitly measures informed traders’ preference of options
over stock. Since the increase in options volume is larger than that in stock volume, OS
should also rise prior to actual repurchases. Based on these considerations, I conjecture
the second hypothesis:
• H2a: Both the stock volume and options volume are higher in pre-repurchase quar-
ters.
• H2b: OS, the options to stock volume ratio, is higher in pre-repurchase quarters.
Although the theoretical literature about informed trading, such as Kyle (1985) and
Glosten and Milgrom (1985), emphasizes the difference between informed and uninformed
agents, trading itself is driven by traders with convictions, whether or not they have su-
perior information. Existing studies hypothesize two main explanations for why a trader
would trade stock or options. First, the trader may have superior information about a
forthcoming corporate event. Second, the trader may have different opinions on the same
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public information from other traders. Depending on whether the corporate events are
predictable, evidence on tradings can be interpreted differently (Christophe et al., 2010).
Tradings prior to pre-scheduled events, such as earnings and dividends announcements,
may be driven by both superior information and different opinions. Unlike dividends,
actual repurchases are not pre-scheduled and difficult for traders to predict its timing and
magnitude (Jagannathan et al., 2000). Since actual repurchases are difficult to predict,
the pre-repurchase tradings are more likely to be driven by superior information than by
different opinions. Therefore, actual repurchases provide a clear setup to examine the
information content of options tradings prior to corporate events.
Prior studies confirm that options tradings convey information about the underlying
stocks (Choy and Wei, 2012; Hu, 2014). Existing studies have constructed various mea-
sures of informed options tradings, such as options trading volume (Chan et al., 2002),
options implied volatility (Bali and Hovakimian, 2009; Cremers and Weinbaum, 2010;
Xing et al., 2010; Bollerslev et al., 2011), and options implied skewness (DeMiguel et
al., 2013). I use options volume to measure informed options tradings for three rea-
sons. First, options volume directly measures the intensity of options tradings and is
publicly observable to most traders. Meanwhile, options implied volatility and skewness
may measure other factors besides informed tradings, and are difficult to comprehend
for most traders. Second, options volume does not rely on any assumptions about the
price processes of underlying stocks, and thus does not introduce any model risks. For
example, the options implied volatility and skewness calculated using Black and Scholes
(1973) model and Heston and Nandi (2000) model are different. Third, options volume
allows me to link options tradings to specific trading strategies that informed traders
may use.
In the current study, I consider two commonly used options trading strategies, i.e.,
directional strategy and volatility strategy. To link options tradings to directional strat-
egy and volatility strategy, I further decompose OS in two dimensions — strike price
and moneyness. This decomposition allows me to disentangle the information about the
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stock return from that about stock volatility. Specifically, when an informed trader has
superior information about stock return, she will use the directional strategy; when she
has superior information about stock volatility, she will use volatility strategy. Therefore,
by examining which trading strategy is used, I can understand what informed traders
know about the future stock return and stock volatility.
The most straightforward and cost-efficient implementation of the directional strategy
is to buy call options or put options. Specifically, the price of call options will go up
(down) when the stock price goes up (down); the price of put options will go up (down)
when the stock price goes down (up). A trader may buy call (put) options if she predicts
that the price of the underlying stock will rise (fall). Therefore, I decompose OS into
CALLOS and PUTOS, corresponding to the call options to stock volume ratio and the
put options to stock volume ratio, respectively. I focus on CALLOS because call options,
on average, have higher liquidity than put options, which makes them more cost-efficient
for informed traders. Moreover, actual repurchases tend to convey favorable information
about the post-repurchase stock return. Therefore, informed traders are more likely to
use the bullish directional strategy (buy call options) than the bearish directional strategy
(buy put options) prior to actual repurchases.
Higher CALLOS in pre-repurchase quarters may indicate the use of bullish directional
strategy by informed traders who have superior information about the post-repurchase
stock return. Therefore, I propose that higher pre-repurchase CALLOS should predict
higher post-repurchase stock returns. Since stock return depends on future operating
performance (Campbell and Shiller, 1988), higher CALLOS should also predict higher
operating performance after actual repurchases. Based on these considerations, I propose
the third hypothesis:
• H3: Pre-repurchase CALLOS, the call options to stock volume ratio, is positively
associated with post-repurchase stock return and operating performance.
The most straightforward and cost-efficient implementation of the volatility strategy is
to buy at-the-money (ATM) options. Specifically, the price of at-the-money options
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will go up (down) when stock volatility goes up (down). A trader may buy at-the-money
options if she predicts that the volatility of the underlying stock will rise. I define ATMOS
as the at-the-money options to stock volume ratio. Higher ATMOS in pre-repurchase
quarters may indicate the use of volatility strategy by informed traders who have superior
information about the post-repurchase stock volatility. Therefore, I propose that higher
pre-repurchase ATMOS should predict higher stock volatility after actual repurchases.
Since stock volatility depends on operating performance volatility (Campbell and Shiller,
1988), higher ATMOS should also predict higher operating performance volatility after
actual repurchases. Based on these considerations, I argue that:
• H4: Pre-repurchase ATMOS, the at-the-money options to stock volume ratio, is
positively associated with post-repurchase stock volatility and operating perfor-
mance volatility.
Corporate governance plays a critical role in maintaining a transparent information envi-
ronment around corporate events. Institutional ownership improves corporate governance
by providing external monitoring. Institutional holdings mitigate the information asym-
metry around corporate events (Gillan and Starks, 2000; McCahery et al., 2016). Higher
institutional holdings improve stock price informativeness and reduce the incentives and
profits of informed tradings (Boehmer and Kelley, 2009). Based on these findings, I
propose the last hypothesis:
• H5: Institutional holdings mitigate the information asymmetry of pre-repurchase
options tradings.
3. Sample and Variable Construction
In constructing the sample, I use Compustat quarterly data for firm quarters from Jan-
uary 1996 to December 2017. Following Billett and Xue (2007), I remove financials and
utilities (SIC in 4900-4949 or 6000-6999), as these firms are in regulated industries and
tend to have unreliable repurchase data. To eliminate firms that have just raised capital
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via initial public offerings, I remove companies without closing stock price data in at
least eight of the prior nine quarters. I also eliminate firms with less than 10,000 shares
outstanding or with a market capitalization of less than or equal to $2 million in the prior
quarter due to low stock liquidity (Brockman et al., 2008). I delete firms with a negative
book value at the beginning of the fiscal quarter since these firms may have covenants
that restrict share repurchase.
As a first pass, I calculate the amount of actual share repurchase as the Compustat
quarterly purchase of common and preferred stock (adjusted for the fact that this variable
is cumulative) minus any decrease in preferred stock (Grullon and Michaely, 2002). Banyi
et al. (2008) identify this measure as the most accurate proxy for actual common shares
repurchased, especially for firms with high levels of employee stock option exercises. To
take into account variation in firm size, I divide the amount of actual repurchase by the
firm’s total assets and denote the ratio as REP. Following Bonaime and Ryngaert (2013),
I create a dummy variable, REPDUM, that equals 1 if a firm buys back more than 1%
of its total shares in a given quarter and equals 0 otherwise, to distinguish repurchase
quarter from non-repurchase quarter. I define quarters with REPDUM equal to 1 (0)
as repurchase (non-repurchase) quarters. Banyi et al. (2008) find that eliminating firms
with common stock repurchases equaling less than 1% of market capitalization improves
the accuracy of the repurchase measure since many small values of “Purchases of Common
and Preferred Stock” are solely due to preferred buybacks. The 1% cutoff also ensures
that the buybacks are non-trivial.
Following Grullon and Michaely (2002), I include three control variables related to
actual repurchase, i.e., firm size (SIZE), market-to-book ratio (MB), and firm leverage
(LEV). Firm size is measured by the percentile rank of a firm’s market cap among firms
listed on NYSE (Fama and French, 1995). Firm leverage is calculated as long-term debt
scaled by total assets.
I use institutional holdings as a proxy for corporate governance (Gillan and Starks,
2000; McCahery et al., 2016) and obtain the data from Thomson-Reuters 13F. For each
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firm, I aggregate all shares held by institutional investors to calculate institutional hold-
ings for each firm quarter. I eliminate firm quarters with missing institutional holdings
information. I define INSOWN as the proportion of stocks owned by institutional in-
vestors.
I obtain stock and options trading volume information from OptionMetrics. Option-
Metrics provides the daily number of contracts traded for each individual option on
US-listed stocks along with the associated bid and ask prices. With these data, I can
aggregate the total daily options volume for each firm by multiplying the total contracts
traded in each option by the end-of-day quote midpoints and then aggregating across all
options listed on the stock (I account for the fact that each contract is for 100 shares
of stock). I define STOCKVOL (OPTIONVOL) as the natural log of quarterly stock
(options) volume. I confine the sample to stocks with valid stock and options volume
information for at least 4 consecutive quarters. I also eliminate stocks with a price lower
than $1 as calculating returns on these stocks may be problematic due to bid-ask bounce.
Following Roll et al. (2010), I define the relative trading activity in options and stock,





To link options volume to the bullish directional strategy and volatility strategy that
informed traders may use, I further decompose OS in two dimensions — strike price and
moneyness. I first define CALLOS as a proxy for the use of bullish directional strategy,





I next define ATMOS as a proxy for the use of volatility strategy, calculated as the






Since informed traders choose to trade stock and options conditional on the trade-off
between the leverage effect of options and the lower trading costs of stock, I include
several control variables. I define STOCKILLIQ (OPTIONILLIQ) as the stock (options)
illiquidity measured by the relative bid-ask spread (Roll, 1984). I use DELTA, which
measures the sensitivity of option price to the change of underlying stock price, as a
proxy for the leverage effect of options. I also include borrowing cost (BOWCOST),
proxied by the risk-free rate, since the leverage effect of options is more valuable when
borrowing is more costly.
I use buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) to assess the change in stock return due
to actual repurchase. Following Barber and Lyon (1997), I estimate BHAR as the differ-
ence of stock return between repurchase quarter and matching non-repurchase quarter.
The matching firm quarter is constructed by identifying all firm quarters in the same
SIZE decile as the repurchase firm in the repurchase quarter. I then select the 20 firm
quarters that are closest in MB (market-to-book ratio) to the repurchase quarter, and
assign equal weights to each firm quarter at the beginning of the quarter. The stock
return of matching non-repurchase quarter is calculated as the mean stock return of the
20 firm quarters.
I use abnormal volatility of stock return (RETABV) to measure the change in stock
volatility due to actual repurchase. Following Hilliard and Savickas (2002), I choose a
volatility event-study methodology based on the GARCH(1, 1) model. I use daily stock
returns to calculate quarterly stock volatility, and then use the quarterly volatility to
estimate the quarterly abnormal volatility. I apply an estimation window of 12 quarters
to calculate predicted volatility, and the abnormal volatility equals the ratio of actual
volatility to predicted volatility.
I use return on assets (ROA), calculated as net income scaled by total assets, to
measure firm operating performance (Lie, 2005). I use the standard deviation of ROA
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(ROAV) to measure operating performance volatility (Michaely et al., 2018). For each
year, ROAV equals the standard deviation of the 4 quarterly ROA in that year.
Figure 1 demonstrates how I design the timeline for actual share repurchase. I measure
actual repurchase in Quarter 0, and define Quarter -1 as the pre-repurchase quarter and
Quarter 1 as the first post-repurchase quarter. Post-repurchase windows include the 12
quarters following Quarter 0. Year 1 begins at Quarter 1, Year 2 at Quarter 5, and Year
3 at Quarter 9. ROA (ROAV) in Year 1 is the mean (standard deviation) of ROA in
Quarter 1 to Quarter 4. ROA (ROAV) in Year 2 is the mean (standard deviation) of ROA
in Quarter 5 to Quarter 8. ROA (ROAV) in Year 3 is the mean (standard deviation) of
ROA in Quarter 9 to Quarter 12. BHAR in Year 1 is the geometric mean of BHAR in
Quarter 1 to Quarter 4. BHAR in Year 2 is the geometric mean of BHAR in Quarter 5
to Quarter 8. BHAR in Year 3 is the geometric mean of BHAR in Quarter 9 to Quarter
12. RETABV in Year 1 is the mean of RETABV in Quarter 1 to Quarter 4. RETABV
in Year 2 is the mean of RETABV in Quarter 5 to Quarter 8. RETABV in Year 3 is the
mean of RETABV in Quarter 9 to Quarter 12.
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the main explanatory and dependent vari-
ables of the current study. The average STOCKVOL is 117% higher than the average
OPTIONVOL, consistent with options being cheaper than stock. The standard devia-
tion of OPTIONVOL is about 60% higher than that of STOCKVOL, consistent with
the notion that options tradings are more likely to be informed because the timing and
magnitude of new information are volatile (Easley et al., 1998). The mean (standard
deviation) of CALLOS is 116% (153%) higher than that of ATMOS, suggesting that
options traders are more likely to use the bullish directional strategy than the volatility
strategy. On average, firms in my sample buy back 0.5 % of the total shares in one
quarter (2% in one year) and show high variation in the amount of actual repurchase,
highlighting the flexibility of share repurchase. The average OPTIONILLIQ is about 52
times higher than the average STOCKILLIQ, consistent with options being less liquid
than stock. The average quarterly (annual) ROA is 0.8% (3.2%), and the average ROAV
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is 1.5%. On average, institutional investors hold 41.4% of the stocks in my sample.
4. Empirical Results
4.1. Information Content of Actual Share Repurchase
This section examines the information content of actual share repurchase in both the
valuation dimension (stock return and operating performance) and the risk dimension
(stock volatility and operating performance volatility). Following Grullon and Michaely
(2004) and Lie (2005), I test if and how actual repurchases predict post-repurchase ab-
normal return and operating performance. To assess the persistence of this predictive
power, I investigate multiple post-repurchase windows ranging from Quarter 1 to Year 3.
I first test the association between actual repurchase (REPDUM) and post-repurchase
buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR). Results in Panel A of Table 2 suggest that re-
purchase quarters are associated with significantly higher post-repurchase buy-and-hold
abnormal returns. REPDUM is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm buys back more
than 1% of its total shares in a given quarter and equals 0 otherwise. Therefore, the
coefficient of REPDUM measures the difference in BHAR between repurchase quarters
(REPDUM = 1) and non-repurchase quarters (REPDUM = 0). This difference increases
from 0.193% in Quarter 1 to 0.411% in Quarter 2 and declines to 0.268% in Quarter
3 and becomes insignificant in Quarter 4, consistent with the notion that quarterly re-
purchase data may take one quarter to be reported and thus more traders have access
to the disclosed actual repurchase information in Quarter 2. Annual post-repurchase
BHAR shows a similar pattern of decline. The difference in the annual BHAR between
repurchase and non-repurchase quarters peaks in Year 1 and declines in Year 2 and Year
3. Similar to Bonaime and Ryngaert (2013), I find persistent positive abnormal returns
following actual repurchases. Additionally, MB is negatively related to BHAR in 6 of the
7 post-repurchase windows, consistent with the findings of Ikenberry et al. (1995) that
repurchase abnormal return positively correlates with stock undervaluation.
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Since stock return depends on firm operating performance (Campbell and Shiller,
1988), I next test the association between actual repurchase (REPDUM) and post-
repurchase operating performance (ROA). Consistent with the findings of Lie (2005), the
results in Panel B of Table 2 suggest that repurchase quarters are followed by significant
improvements in operating performance. In all post-repurchase windows, REPDUM has
a significantly positive coefficient. Specifically, the ROA in Quarter 1 (Year 1) of repur-
chase quarters is, on average, 0.264 (0.156) higher than that of non-repurchase quarters.
This difference peaks in Quarter 1 and drops to 0.06 in Year 3. Additionally, I find
that firms with a larger size, higher market-to-book ratio, and lower leverage, tend to
have higher post-repurchase ROA, consistent with the findings of Grullon and Michaely
(2004).
I further investigate if and how actual repurchases predict post-repurchase stock
volatility and operating performance volatility. I first test the association between actual
repurchase (REPDUM) and post-repurchase abnormal volatility (RETABV). Results in
Panel A of Table 3 suggest that repurchase quarters are associated with significantly
higher post-repurchase abnormal volatility. In all post-repurchase windows, REPDUM
is positively associated with RETABV. Specifically, the RETABV in Quarter 1 (Year 1)
of repurchase quarters is, on average, 0.107 (0.115) higher than that of non-repurchase
quarters. In Year 3, this difference drops to 0.073 (1% significance level). Further, firms
with a smaller size, higher market-to-book ratio, and higher leverage, tend to have higher
post-repurchase RETABV, consistent with the findings of Fama and French (1995).
Since stock volatility depends on the volatility of firm operating performance (Camp-
bell and Shiller, 1988), I next test the association between actual repurchase (REPDUM)
and post-repurchase operating performance volatility (ROAV). The results in Panel B of
Table 3 demonstrate that repurchase quarters are followed by significantly higher operat-
ing performance volatility. In all post-repurchase windows, REPDUM has a significantly
positive coefficient. Specifically, the ROAV in Year 1 (Year 2) of repurchase quarters is,
on average, 4.4 (5.8) percent points higher than that of non-repurchase quarters. Inter-
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estingly, this difference grows to 0.066 in Year 3. One possible reason for this result is
that stock volatility is a leading indicator of operating performance volatility. As a result,
it takes more time for operating performance volatility to decline to a normal level.
Taken together, the results in Table 2 and Table 3 provide support for Hypothesis
1. I find that firm operating performance significantly improves after actual repurchase,
and the stock market responds positively to actual repurchase. My findings are consis-
tent in spirit with those of Lie (2005), who documents significant operating performance
improvements following repurchase announcements. In terms of post-repurchase abnor-
mal return, my findings are similar to those of Grullon and Michaely (2004), who find
positive abnormal returns following repurchase announcements. However, the current pa-
per focuses on actual repurchases instead of repurchase announcements, and finds more
persistent results than the existing papers. This evidence confirms that actual repur-
chases convey more credible information than repurchase announcements. Alternatively,
the persistent predictive power of actual repurchase on post-repurchase abnormal return
may suggest market underreaction (Ikenberry et al., 1995). My findings that actual
repurchases predict higher abnormal volatility and operating performance volatility con-
tradict the prior studies that suggest share repurchases reduce firm risks by mitigating the
agency cost of free cash flows (Grullon and Michaely, 2004). One potential explanation
for my findings is that actual repurchases reduce cash holdings and increase firm leverage,
and thus increase firm risk (Chen and Wang, 2012; Myers and Majluf, 1984). Moreover,
recent evidence shows that an increasing number of firms choose to raise capital to fi-
nance their repurchases, which further increases firm leverage and risk (Farre-Mensa et
al., 2018). The current study, using more recent data (1996-2017 compared to 1980-1997
in Grullon and Michaely, 2004), suggests that actual repurchases convey information of
higher firm risk instead of lower firm risk. This change in the information content of
actual repurchase may be caused by the new trend of firms financing repurchase with
external capital by issuing stocks and bonds. Alternatively, my results may suggest that
the actual repurchase and repurchase announcement convey different information about
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firm risk.
4.2. Pre-repurchase Options Trading
Building on my findings that actual repurchases convey information in both the valua-
tion dimension (stock return and operating performance) and the risk dimension (stock
volatility and operating performance volatility), this section examines options tradings
prior to actual repurchase to assess the presence of informed tradings. Since informed
traders choose to trade stock and options conditional on the trade-off between the lever-
age effect of options and the lower trading costs of stock, I first examine both the pre-
repurchase stock and options volumes, and then investigate the pre-repurchase options
to stock volume ratio. Figure 2 demonstrates that the overall repurchase intensity (mea-
sured by the total number of repurchase firms in the US) highly correlates with stock and
options market volumes prior to 2012. Since 2012, the options market volume no longer
correlates with the total number of repurchasing firms. This deviation may be caused
by the notable decline in stock market volatility. Specifically, the VIX index declines by
more than 300% from 38.52 at the end of 2011 to 9.22 at the end of 2017, reducing the
profit opportunities of trading on volatility in the options market. Consistent with the
findings of Bliss et al. (2015), the overall repurchase intensity falls sharply during the
2008 financial crisis. However, the stock market volume only shows a moderate decline
during the same period. The panic selling of stocks during the financial crisis may have
partially offset the decline in stock market volume.
To eliminate concerns about time-series dependence, I compare the stock volume
(STOCKVOL) and options volume (OPTIONVOL) in repurchase quarters versus non-
repurchase quarters in Figure 3. Panel A and Panel B show that the mean STOCKVOL
and mean OPTIONVOL are higher in repurchase quarters (REPDUM = 1) than in
non-repurchase quarters (REPDUM = 0). Panel C and Panel D show that the 25%
quantile and 75% quantile of OPTIONVOL and STOCKVOL are higher in repurchase
quarters than in non-repurchase quarters. Overall, Figure 2 and Figure 3 illustrate that
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the repurchase quarters tend to have higher trading volumes in both stock and options.
Based on the observations in Figure 2 and Figure 3, I continue to quantitatively
examine how the amount of actual repurchase (REP) affects pre-repurchase stock vol-
ume (STOCKVOL) and options volume (OPTIONVOL). I follow Bonaime and Ryngaert
(2013) to segment the test results on the value of REPDUM. Panel A of Table 4 tests the
full sample, while Panel B (Panel C) focuses on the subsample with REPDUM equal to
0 (1). Univariate results in column 1 of Panel A, B, and C show that REP is positively
related to STOCKVOL at a 1% significance level. After I add more control variables
in column 2 and column 3, the sign and significance of this relationship remain un-
changed. My results suggest that stock traders may have superior information about the
forthcoming actual repurchases, because the timing and magnitude of actual repurchases
are difficult to predict. Moreover, I find that STOCKILLIQ is negatively associated with
STOCKVOL, consistent with the notion that higher stock illiquidity makes it more costly
to trade stock.
I next test how the amount of actual repurchase (REP) affects pre-repurchase options
volume (OPTIONVOL) in Table 5. In the 8 of 9 specifications, REP has a significantly
positive coefficient. When I control for SIZE, MB, and LEV and focus on the non-
repurchase quarters, REP shows no significant impact on OPTIONVOL. This evidence
suggests that the REP in non-repurchase quarters, which measures the trivial buybacks of
preferred stocks, conveys less credible information than the REP in repurchase quarters.
Column 1 of Panel C shows that 1 unit increase in REP is associated with 7.312 units
increase in OPTIONVOL. When I control for SIZE, MB, and LEV, 1 unit increase in
REP is associated with 7.142 units increase in OPTIONVOL. These results suggest that
options traders may have superior information about the forthcoming actual repurchases,
because the timing and magnitude of actual repurchases are difficult to predict. I also
find that OPTIONILLIQ is negatively related to OPTIONVOL, consistent with the fact
that higher options illiquidity makes it more costly to trade options.
Based on the findings in Table 4 and Table 5, I explicitly test how the amount of
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actual repurchase (REP) affects traders’ choice between stock and options (OS) in the
pre-repurchase quarters. As shown in Panel A of Table 6, REP has no significant impact
on OS when the panel regression tests are conducted on the full sample. When I confine
the tests to repurchase quarters in Panel C, I find that REP has significantly positive
coefficients for all the three specifications, suggesting that the increase in options volume
is higher than that in stock volume when a firm buys back a nontrivial amount of shares.
Univariate results in column 1 of Panel C show that a one standard deviation increase
in REP is associated with a 0.09 standard deviation increase in OS. In column 2 of
Panel C, I control for SIZE, MB, and LEV, and find that a one standard deviation
increase in REP is associated with a 0.08 standard deviation increase in OS. These results
confirm that informed traders prefer options over stock due to the implicit leverage of
options. Additionally, OPTIONILLIQ has a coefficient of -1.195 at a 1% significance
level, consistent with the fact that higher options illiquidity reduces the leverage benefit
of options trading. Surprisingly, when I focus on non-repurchase quarters in Panel B, the
signs of the coefficients of REP become negative. This evidence confirms that the method
of Banyi et al. (2008) of eliminating firms with common stock repurchases equaling less
than 1% of market capitalization improves the accuracy of the repurchase measure. The
trivial buyback of preferred stock may add noise to the measure of actual repurchase
(Bonaime and Ryngaert, 2013).
To link options tradings to the bullish directional strategy and volatility strategy that
informed traders may use, I further decompose OS in two dimensions — strike price and
moneyness. I define CALLOS (ATOMOS) as a proxy for the use of bullish directional
strategy (volatility strategy), calculated as the natural log of call (at-the-money) options
to stock volume ratio. I further test the association between the amount of actual re-
purchase (REP) and pre-repurchase use of bullish directional strategy (CALLOS) and
present the results in Table 7. These results are similar to those in Table 6. In Panel C, I
focus on the repurchase quarters and find that REP shows positive impacts on CALLOS
for all the three specifications. Univariate results in column 1 of Panel C show that
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a one standard deviation increase in REP is associated with a 0.08 standard deviation
increase in CALLOS. In column 2, I control for SIZE, MB, and LEV, and find that a one
standard deviation increase in REP is associated with a 0.07 standard deviation increase
in CALLOS. These results suggest that some options traders use the bullish directional
strategy in the pre-repurchase quarters. The result in column 3 shows that a one stan-
dard deviation increase in DELTA is associated with a 0.15 standard deviation increase
in CALLOS, consistent with the idea that higher leverage effect of options makes options
trading more attractive to informed traders.
I further test the association between the amount of actual repurchase (REP) and pre-
repurchase use of volatility strategy (ATMOS) and present the results in Table 8. The
results are different from those in Table 6 and Table 7. In the 7 of 9 specifications, REP
shows positive impacts on ATMOS. Univariate results in column 1 of Panel C show that
a one standard deviation increase in REP is associated with a 0.18 standard deviation
increase in ATMOS. In column 2 of Panel C, I control for SIZE, MB, and LEV, and
find that a one standard deviation increase in REP is associated with a 0.15 standard
deviation increase in ATMOS. These results suggest that some options traders use the
volatility strategy in the pre-repurchase quarters.
Overall, these results provide support for Hypothesis 2 and indicate that informed
traders may use both the bullish directional strategy and the volatility strategy prior
to actual repurchase. Both the stock and options volumes rise in the pre-repurchase
quarters, and this evidence suggests the presence of informed trading since the timing
and magnitude of actual repurchase are difficult to predict without superior information.
Furthermore, the evidence that OS positively correlates with the amount of actual re-
purchase suggests that traders may prefer options over stock due to the leverage effect of
options. Additionally, I find pre-repurchase CALLOS and ATMOS rise when firms buy
back a nontrivial amount of stocks, suggesting the use of bullish directional strategy and
volatility strategy.
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4.3. Information Content of Pre-repurchase Options Trading
In the previous section, I identify the use of bullish directional strategy and volatility
strategy that options traders use in the pre-repurchase quarters. In this section, I further
explore the information content of the pre-repurchase options tradings. Specifically, I
test if the pre-repurchase options tradings can predict post-repurchase stock return and
stock volatility.
I first examine if and how the pre-repurchase use of bullish directional strategy (CAL-
LOS) predicts post-repurchase abnormal return (BHAR) and operating performance
(ROA). Table 9 presents the results of portfolio analysis examining the association be-
tween pre-repurchase CALLOS and post-repurchase BHAR (Panel A) and ROA (Panel
B). I sort post-repurchase BHAR (Panel A) and ROA (Panel B) by the pre-repurchase
CALLOS. The last column in Panel A (Panel B) shows that the portfolio of firms with
the highest CALLOS has significantly higher average BHAR (ROA) than the portfolio
of firms with the lowest CALLOS. Panel A shows that the difference in BHAR between
the highest (quintile 5) and the lowest (quintile 1) CALLOS groups declines over the 3
years after the actual repurchase. These results suggest that the pre-repurchase use of
bullish directional strategy conveys favorable information about future stock return and
operating performance.
I next examine if and how the pre-repurchase use of volatility strategy (ATMOS) pre-
dicts post-repurchase abnormal volatility (RETABV) and operating performance volatil-
ity (ROAV). Table 10 presents the results of portfolio analysis examining the association
between pre-repurchase ATMOS and post-repurchase RETABV (Panel A) and ROAV
(Panel B). I sort post-repurchase RETABV (Panel A) and ROAV (Panel B) by the pre-
repurchase ATMOS. The last column in Panel A (Panel B) shows that the portfolio
of firms with the highest ATMOS has significantly higher average RETABV (ROAV)
than the portfolio of firms with the lowest ATMOS. These results suggest that the pre-
repurchase use of volatility strategy conveys information of higher firm risk following
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actual repurchases.
I continue to test these associations with panel regression models. To eliminate the
noise of trivial buybacks of preferred stock (Banyi et al., 2008), I confine the test samples
to the repurchase quarters (REPDUM = 1). Additionally, using the subsample of re-
purchase quarters creates implicit interaction effects between actual repurchase and the
explanatory variables. I present these results in Table 11 and Table 12. Panel A of Table
11 shows that CALLOS has positive impacts on BHAR in the 6 of 7 post-repurchase
windows. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in CALLOS leads to 0.032 stan-
dard deviation increase in BHAR in Quarter 1, 0.031 in Quarter 2, and 0.07 in Quarter
3. Panel B of Table 11 shows that CALLOS has positive impacts on ROA in the 6 of
7 post-repurchase windows. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in CALLOS
leads to a 0.2 standard deviation increase in BHAR in Year 1, 0.1 in Year 2, and 0.06 in
Year 3. These results suggest that the pre-repurchase use of bullish directional strategy
complements the information conveyed by actual repurchase.
I find similar results in Table 12. Panel A of Table 12 shows that ATMOS has positive
impacts on RETABV in all the 7 post-repurchase windows. Specifically, a one standard
deviation increase in ATMOS leads to a 0.07 standard deviation increase in RETABV
in Quarter 1, 1.5 in Quarter 2, and 1.93 in Quarter 3. Panel B of Table 12 shows that
ATMOS has positive impacts on ROAV in all the 3 post-repurchase windows. Specifically,
a one standard deviation increase in ATMOS leads to a 1.5 standard deviation increase
in BHAR in Year 1, 1.80 in Year 2, and 1.98 in Year 3. These results suggest that the
pre-repurchase use of volatility strategy complements the information conveyed by actual
repurchase.
Overall, my results confirm Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4, and prove that pre-
repurchase options tradings complement the information conveyed by actual repurchases
in both the valuation dimension (stock return and operating performance) and the risk
dimension (stock volatility and operating performance volatility). The pre-repurchase
bullish directional strategy has positive returns because higher actual repurchases are
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followed by higher abnormal returns; the pre-repurchase volatility strategy has positive
returns because higher actual repurchases are followed by higher abnormal volatility.
Consequently, my results suggest that not only are the pre-repurchase options tradings
informed, but they complement the information conveyed by actual repurchases.
4.4. Institutional Ownership and Information Content of Pre-repurchase
Options Trading
Institutional ownership, as an important source of corporate governance, plays a crit-
ical role in alleviating information asymmetry (Gillan and Starks, 2000; McCahery et
al., 2016). Based on my findings that pre-repurchase options tradings complement the
information conveyed by actual repurchases, I further investigate the role of corporate
governance in this information environment. In this section, I use institutional owner-
ship (INSOWN) as a proxy for corporate governance, and test if the external monitoring
provided by institutional investors can reduce the information content of pre-repurchase
options tradings. I present the results in Table 13 and Table 14. The regression mod-
els in Table 13 (Table 14) extends those in Table 11 (Table 12) with an interaction
term between CALLOS (ATMOS) and INSOWN. Panel A of Table 13 shows that higher
institutional holdings reduce the predictive power of the pre-repurchase use of bullish
directional strategy on post-repurchase abnormal return. Specifically, in the 5 of 7 post-
repurchase windows, the interaction term has significantly negative coefficients, reducing
the net effect of CALLOS on post-repurchase BHAR. I find similar results in Panel B of
Table 13, the negative coefficient of the interaction term offsets CALLOS’s impacts on
post-repurchase ROA. Panel A of Table 14 shows that higher institutional holdings reduce
the predictive power of the pre-repurchase use of volatility strategy on post-repurchase
abnormal volatility. Specifically, in the 5 of 7 post-repurchase windows, the interaction
term has significantly negative coefficients, reducing the net effect of ATMOS on post-
repurchase RETABV. I find similar results in Panel B of Table 14, the negative coefficient
of the interaction term offsets ATMOS’s impacts on post-repurchase ROAV in Year 1 and
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Year 2.
Overall, my findings support Hypothesis 5. Institutional investors are able to pro-
vide effective external monitoring that reduces the information content of pre-repurchase
options tradings. In other words, the pre-repurchase use of bullish directional strat-
egy and volatility strategy will have lower returns when the repurchase firm has higher
institutional holdings. Institutional ownership makes it more difficult to trade on supe-
rior information prior to actual repurchases. My findings confirm the role of corporate
governance in mitigating information asymmetry around corporate events.
5. Robustness Check
To address the concerns of unobserved factors and spurious effects, I use the 2003 mod-
ification to SEC Rule 10b-18 as a natural experiment to assess the robustness of my
findings. On December 17, 2003, the Securities and Exchange Commission modified
Rule 10b-18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to require all repurchasing firms
to report the total number of shares repurchased, the average price paid per share, the
number of shares purchased as part of a publicly announced repurchase plan, and the
maximum number (or approximate dollar value) of shares remaining under other plans.
This regulation, which applies to all quarterly and annual filings for periods ending on or
after March 15, 2004, reduces the information asymmetry of actual repurchases, because
it enhances information disclosure of repurchases, which benefits uninformed traders.
The 2003 modification to Rule 10b-18 provides a unique opportunity for the current
paper to construct a difference-in-difference analysis.
My methodology is similar in spirit to that of Borochin and Yang (2017). I start
by creating three dummy variables, i.e., HCALLOS, HATMOS, and HDISC. HCALLOS
equals 1 if a firm has above-median CALLOS in a given quarter and equals 0 other-
wise. HATMOS equals 1 if a firm has above-median ATMOS in a given quarter and
equals 0 otherwise. Following Bonaime (2015), I define HDISC (high disclosure period)
as a dummy variable that equals 1 if the observation is from Year 2004 Quarter 1 to
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Year 2017 Quarter 4 and equals 0 otherwise. My design of difference-in-difference anal-
ysis is based on these three dummy variables. The 2003 modification to Rule 10b-18
can be considered an exogenous policy shock, because individual firms are unlikely to
cause this regulatory change to happen. Moreover, HCALLOS and HATMOS indicate
higher degrees of information asymmetry in the pre-repurchase quarters, because more
options tradings may imply a higher probability of informed tradings. Therefore, the
2003 modification to Rule 10b-18, which improves the quality of information disclosure
of repurchases, should have larger impacts on firms with higher information asymmetry
(HCALLOS equal to 1 and HATMOS equal to 1).
I present the results of the difference-in-difference analysis in Table 15 and Table 16.
Panel A of Table 15 shows that the interaction term between HCALLOS and HDISC has
significantly negative impacts on BHAR in the 6 of 7 post-repurchase windows, suggesting
that the 2003 modification to Rule 10b-18 reduces the profitability of the pre-repurchase
use of bullish directional strategy, because the negative coefficients reduce the net effect
of HCALLOS on BHAR. I observe similar results in Panel B of Table 15. The interaction
term between HCALLOS and HDISC has significantly negative impacts on ROA in all
the 7 post-repurchase windows.
Panel A of Table 16 shows that the interaction term between HATMOS and HDISC
has significantly negative impacts on RETABV in all the 7 post-repurchase windows,
suggesting that the 2003 modification to Rule 10b-18 reduces the profitability of the
pre-repurchase use of volatility strategy, because the negative coefficients reduce the net
effect of HATMOS on RETABV. I observe similar results in Panel B of Table 16. The
interaction term between HATMOS and HDISC has significantly negative impacts on
ROAV in Year 1 and Year 2.
Overall, these results confirm that my findings are not driven by unobservable factors
or spurious effects. The 2003 modification to Rule 10b-18 reduces the information ad-
vantage of options traders in the pre-repurchase quarters. This effect is more prominent
among firms with a higher degree of information asymmetry.
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Furthermore, I conduct a placebo test to address robustness concerns. I randomly
assign the value of 0 or 1 to the variable REPDUMR and retest Hypothesis 1 using this
random variable REPDUMR in place of REPDUM. I present the placebo test results
in Appendix. REPDUMR no longer predicts post-repurchase abnormal return, operat-
ing performance, abnormal volatility, or operating performance volatility. These results
confirm that my findings are not driven by random comovement of the dependent and
explanatory variables.
6. Conclusion
The current paper studies the information content of actual share repurchase within the
context of informed options trading. I document that pre-repurchase options tradings
complement the information conveyed by actual repurchases, and predict higher and
more volatile stock return and operating performance. Furthermore, the pre-repurchase
use of bullish directional strategy (measured by call options to stock volume ratio) pre-
dicts higher post-repurchase abnormal return and operating performance. This evidence
suggests that actual repurchases and pre-repurchase options tradings convey favorable
complementary information about post-repurchase stock return and operating perfor-
mance. The pre-repurchase use of volatility strategy (measured by at-the-money options
to stock volume ratio) predicts higher post-repurchase stock volatility and operating
performance volatility. One possible reason for the increase in firm risk is the increase
in leverage caused by actual repurchases. Moreover, I find that institutional ownership
alleviates the information asymmetry of pre-repurchase options tradings.
In sum, my evidence suggests that options tradings complement the information con-
veyed by actual share repurchase. In a broader sense, the information content of corpo-
rate events can be fully understood only within the context of informed tradings, and




EPS-MOTIVATED SHARE REPURCHASE AND STOCK PRICE
CRASH RISK
1. Introduction
Over the last two decades, share repurchase has emerged as the dominant payout
channel, offering a more flexible means of returning excess cash to investors for public
firms (Bens et al., 2003; Almeida et al., 2016). Between 2008 and 2017, 466 of the
S&P 500 companies spent around $4 trillion on share repurchase, equal to 53 percent
of profits. The total amount of share repurchase exceeded that of dividends in 2001
(Grullon and Michaely, 2002). The sheer amount of share repurchase and the notice-
able shift in the preference of the payout method have sparked discussions about the
potential of this trend. Classical financial theories maintain that large and mature
firms, compared to small and young firms, tend to have higher profitability and fewer
investment opportunities. Therefore, payouts, either via share repurchase or divi-
dends, may alleviate the potential agency conflict induced by excessive cash holdings
(Jensen, 1986; Grullon and Michaely, 2004; DeAngelo, et al., 2006). Consequently,
the surging amount of share repurchase should indicate more prudent investment and
better corporate governance of public firms. However, observers hold mixed opinions
on the prevalence of stock buyback.
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On the one hand, share repurchase is deemed as being more flexible than dividends,
which is valuable to small and financially constrained firms (Ikenberry and Vermaelen,
1996; Grullon and Michaely, 2002). On the other hand, investors and regulators are
concerned that managers may use share repurchase as an earnings management tool.
Specifically, managers may use share repurchase to inflate earnings per share (EPS) by
reducing the number of shares outstanding (Bens et al., 2003). Hribar et al. (2006) doc-
ument the extensive use of EPS-motivated share repurchase. Managers may use share
repurchase to manipulate EPS, and earnings management, as a bad news hoarding be-
havior, is positively associated with stock price crash risk (Hutton et al., 2009). Does
EPS-motivated share repurchase affect stock price crash risk? This paper attempts to
answer this question by studying the empirical link between EPS-motivated share re-
purchase and stock price crash risk. We argue that managers may use share repurchase
to boost EPS to delay the release of negative information when the EPS would have
remained stagnant or declined in the absence of the repurchase. However, such bad news
hoarding activity is costly and will eventually be unsustainable. When the managers
release the accumulated bad news, it causes a great downward adjustment to the stock
prices.
This paper examines the impacts of EPS-motivated share repurchase on both ex-post
and ex-ante (expected) stock price crash risk. We find no evidence that EPS-motivated
share repurchase affects ex-post stock price crash risk. Meanwhile, we find that EPS-
motivated share repurchase significantly increases expected stock price crash risk, which
is measured by implied volatility skew in the options market. Moreover, EPS-motivated
repurchase predicts significantly higher expected crash risk in 1-4 quarters following the
current fiscal quarter, indicating the persistent impacts of EPS-motivated repurchase.
This paper also investigates the interplay between EPS-motivated share repurchase and
stock liquidity and its impacts on expected crash risk. Consistent with the findings of
Brockman et al. (2008), this paper finds that higher stock liquidity encourages managers
to use share repurchase to manipulate EPS and hence increases expected crash risk. This
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evidence confirms that stock liquidity is an important factor to consider when managers
buy back stocks. Besides, this paper studies the role of corporate governance in the
EPS-motivated share repurchase - expected crash risk relation and find that corporate
governance, proxied by institutional ownership and analyst coverage, significantly reduces
the expected crash risk induced by EPS-motivated repurchase. This evidence suggests
that corporate governance can maintain the stability of the stock market by reducing
investors’ expected crash risk.
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it relates to the ex-
tensive studies on share repurchase. This literature suggests that firms buy back stocks
to signal undervaluation (Ikenberry et al., 1995; Brockman and Chung, 2001; Peyer and
Vermaelen, 2005), to signal strong future performance (Lie, 2005), to boost employee in-
centives (Babenko, 2009), to mitigate the dilutive effects of stock option exercises (Kahle,
2002; Bens et al., 2003), to defend takeover (Bagwell, 1991), to distribute excess cash
(Dittmar, 2000; Grullon and Michaely, 2004), etc. This paper builds on existing findings
of EPS-motivated share repurchase (Bens et al., 2003; Hribar et al., 2006; Almeida et al.,
2016) and links it with stock price crash risk within the bad news hoarding framework.
Second, this paper extends research on stock price crash risk. These studies document
that stock price crash risk is associated with short interest of stock (Callen and Fang,
2015), CEO overconfidence (Kim et al., 2016), CEO age (Andreou et al., 2017), stock
liquidity (Chang et al., 2017), institutional ownership (An and Zhang, 2013; Callen and
Fang, 2013), earnings smoothing (Chen et al., 2017), ownership-control wedge (Hong et
al., 2017), transparency of financial statements (Hutton et al., 2009), tax avoidance (Kim
et al., 2011), etc. This paper identifies EPS-motivated share repurchase as a new form
of bad news hoarding behavior that increases stock price crash risk.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature
and develops hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample and variables. Section 4 reports
the results, and Section 5 concludes.
30
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
2.1. EPS-motivated Share Repurchase
Existing studies show that firms manage reported earnings to produce positive profits, to
avoid earnings decreases, and to meet or exceed analysts’ earnings expectations (Hayn,
1995; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Degeorge et al., 1999; Burgstahler and Eames,
2002). The most salient of these earnings benchmarks is analysts’ EPS forecasts (Brown
and Caylor, 2005). Managers admit that they are motivated to beat analysts’ quarterly
EPS forecasts to build credibility and preserve their reputation with capital markets,
to maintain or increase the firm’s stock price, and to avoid the uncertainty created by
missing the forecast (Graham et al., 2005).
Share repurchases reduce the number of shares outstanding, which allows managers
to boost EPS without increasing earnings. Using share repurchase to manipulate EPS
is flexible because managers can choose whether and when to buy back stocks (Cook
et al., 2003). Moreover, SEC does not require public firms to provide details about the
timing, price, or volume of their repurchase transactions in real time. The impact on
the number of shares outstanding, coupled with the limited visibility to investors, makes
share repurchase an effective EPS manipulation tool. Various studies have confirmed
this notion. Bens et al. (2003) show that managers use share repurchase to sustain
EPS growth when dilutive employee stock options are exercised. Hribar et al. (2006)
find the extensive use of EPS-motivated stock repurchases among firms that would have
missed analysts’ forecasts without the repurchase. Myers et al. (2007) demonstrate
that firms reporting at least 20 consecutive quarters of non-decreasing EPS appear to
strategically time stock repurchases to avoid EPS declines. Farrell et al. (2014) show that
share repurchases are prevalent as a mechanism to increase EPS and that debt-financing
constraints discourage the use of EPS-motivated repurchases. Cheng et al. (2015) find
that a firm is more likely to conduct stock buyback when its CEO’s bonus directly
depends on EPS. Almeida et al. (2016) find that the probability of share repurchases
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that increase EPS is significantly higher for firms that would have just missed the EPS
forecast in the absence of the repurchases. Finally, Brav et al. (2005) report that over
76% of the CEOs, CFOs, and treasurers who responded to their survey on dividend and
stock buyback policies said that increasing EPS is an “important” or “very important”
consideration in their firms’ stock repurchase decisions.
2.2. Stock Price Crash Risk
2.2.1. Ex-post Stock Price Crash Risk
Jin and Myers (2006) propose a theoretical framework linking bad news hoarding behavior
to crash risk. Specifically, managers control the disclosure of information about the firm
to the public and a threshold level exists at which managers will stop withholding bad
news. The lack of full transparency concerning managers’ investment and operating
decisions and firm performance allows managers to capture a portion of cash flows in
ways not perceived by outside investors. Covering losses caused by a temporary bad
performance by hiding firm-specific bad news, managers attempt to recover the losses
with improved earnings in the future. However, if a sufficiently long run of bad news
accumulates to a critical threshold level without a material improvement in firm operating
performance, managers will choose to give up, and all of the negative firm-specific shocks
become public at once. This disclosure causes a corresponding crash — a large negative
outlier in the distribution of stock returns. Existing empirical evidence confirms that bad
news hoarding behavior is positively associated with crash risk. Jin and Myers’s (2006)
cross-country evidence indicates that firms in more opaque countries are more likely to
experience stock crashes. Hutton et al. (2009) find firm-level evidence of a positive
relation between accrual manipulation and crash risk. Kim et al. (2011) document that
corporate tax avoidance is positively related to firm-specific stock price crash risk. Callen
and Fang (2013) find that equity ownership by transient institutions is positively related
to future crash risk. Andreou et al. (2017) demonstrate that firms with younger CEOs
are more likely to experience stock price crashes. Chang et al. (2017) find that stock
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liquidity induces managers to withhold bad news, fearing that its disclosure will lead to
selling by transient investors, which increases future stock price crash risk.
2.2.2. Ex-ante Stock Price Crash Risk
Besides ex-post stock price crash risk, ex-ante or expected stock price crash risk has
attracted interest in emerging literature. Investors’ expected crash risk can be indicated
by the options implied volatility skew curve (Bates, 1991; Dumas et al., 1998; Pan, 2002).
This skew curve, discovered since the crash of October 1987, refers to the skew pattern
when the volatilities implied by observed option prices are plotted against strike prices
(Rubinstein, 1994). The skew curve suggests that the implied volatility of low strike price
options, especially OTM (out-of-the-money) put options, is higher than that of high strike
price options, especially ATM (at-the-money) call options. This asymmetric volatility
implies that OTM put options are more expensive than ATM call options, which deviates
from the Black and Scholes (1973) option pricing model. Existing studies have proposed
various explanations for this asymmetry, but the overall skew curve is widely deemed
to reflect investors’ expectations of future crash risk, as well as their aversion to such
crash risk (Bates 1991; Dumas et al., 1998; Pan 2002). Rubinstein (1994) attributes the
implied volatility skew to investors’ crash-aversion following the crash of 1987. Bollen
and Whaley (2004) propose a buying pressure model and argue that when investors
obtain the likelihood of a negative event, the demand for OTM put options increases
relative to ATM call options, resulting in volatility skew. Bates (2000) argues that the
implied volatility skew reflects investors’ perception that a significant price decline in the
underlying asset is more likely. OTM put options provide explicit portfolio insurance
against substantial downward movements in the market, and have been traded at high
prices relative to ATM call options.
Kim and Zhang (2014) document that financial reporting opacity significantly in-
creases the expected crash risk. Kim et al. (2016) find that expected crash risk decreases
with financial statement comparability, and this negative relation is more pronounced
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in an environment where managers are more prone to withhold bad news. Kim et al.
(2019) find a significant increase in a firm’s expected crash risk after an exogenous drop
in analyst coverage and suggest analyst coverage disciplines managers from hoarding bad
news.
2.3. Link between EPS-motivated Share Repurchase and Stock Price Crash
Risk
Bad news hoarding behaviors affect not only stock price crash risk but also the expected
stock price crash risk. Expected crash risk reflects investors’ ex-ante perception of fu-
ture crash risk and their aversion to such crash risk. This paper argues that managers
may use share repurchase, as an EPS manipulation tool, to hoard bad news at risk of
stock price crash because a stagnant EPS or a declining EPS is considered bad news
for a firm and may hurt the managers’ reputation and career prospects (Graham et al.,
2005). Therefore, EPS-motivated share repurchase, as a bad news hoarding behavior,
may increase ex-post and ex-ante stock price crash risk. Based on these considerations,
the first hypothesis follows (stated in the alternative form):
H1: Firms with a higher level of EPS-motivated share repurchase are associated with
higher stock price crash risk.
2.4. Stock Liquidity
Brockman et al. (2008) find that higher stock liquidity encourages the use of share
repurchases over dividends. Unlike dividends, share repurchase involves trading stocks in
the open market. When managers buy back stocks, the buying actions will drive up stock
price and make repurchases more costly. As such, a manager needs to consider the price
impact of share repurchase when she plans to use repurchase to boost EPS. When stock
liquidity is high, the manager is more likely to use share repurchase to boost EPS due to
lower costs of share repurchase. When stock liquidity is low, the manager may consider
other cheaper earnings management tools, such as accrual manipulation. Therefore,
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stock liquidity impacts stock price crash risk by affecting the costs of EPS-motivated
share repurchase. Based on these considerations, the second hypothesis follows:
H2: The association between EPS-motivated share repurchase and stock price crash
risk is more pronounced among firms with higher stock liquidity.
2.5. Corporate Governance
Bad news hoarding behaviors occur when managers pursue short-term stock price growth
at risk of long-term stock price crash. Moreover, EPS-motivated share repurchases con-
sume the cash that could otherwise finance future investments. Effective corporate gover-
nance curbs short-termism by aligning the interests of managers and stockholders over a
long run (Holmstrom, 1979). Sanjai and Bolton (2008) confirm that corporate governance
adds value to a firm in the long run. Xie et al. (2003) find that corporate governance
significantly reduces managers’ earnings management behavior. Existing literature links
institutional ownership and analyst coverage to corporate governance. Institutional in-
vestors provide corporate governance via external monitoring. Chung et al. (2002) find
that institutional investors reduce opportunistic earnings management by providing ex-
ternal monitoring. Schmidt and Fahlenbrach (2017) find that reduced external monitor-
ing from institutional investors worsens corporate governance. McCahery et al. (2016)’
survey shows prevalent behind-the-scenes intervention as well as governance-motivated
exit of institutional investors. Gillan and Starks (2000) find that shareholder proposals
sponsored by institutions gain substantially more support than proposals sponsored by
individuals, suggesting the governance role of institutional investors. Yu (2008) find that
firms followed by more analysts manage their earnings less. Lehmann (2019) find that an
increase in governance analyst coverage results in increased governance quality, improved
liquidity, and improved investor breadth. Sun and Liu (2011) find that analyst coverage
is positively associated with accounting conservatism.
This paper argues that corporate governance, proxied by institutional ownership and
analyst coverage, discipline managers from using EPS-motivated share repurchase to
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hoard bad news and thus reduce the stock price crash risk induced by EPS-motivated
repurchase. Based on these considerations, the third hypothesis follows:
H3: The association between EPS-motivated share repurchase and stock price crash
risk is less pronounced among firms with better corporate governance.
3. Variable Construction and Sample
3.1. EPS-motivated Share Repurchase
Stock repurchase has a confounding impact on EPS that is determined by the relative
magnitude of two opposing effects: a numerator effect and a denominator effect. The
effect of a repurchase on the EPS denominator is straightforward. Stock repurchases that
occur at the beginning of the period are deducted from shares outstanding for the full
period, whereas repurchases that occur at the end of the period have no effect on the
EPS denominator that period. In other words, the EPS denominator either decreases or
remains unchanged as a result of the repurchase and its timing during the period.
The effect of a repurchase on the EPS numerator arises because buying back shares
requires a cash payout, and this outlay decreases earnings by the amount of any foregone
return on cash used (or interest expense incurred on cash borrowed) for repurchases.
Stock repurchases increase EPS only when the foregone return (or interest expense in-
curred) on the cash paid out is less than the firm’s earnings-to-price ratio at the time of
the buyback (Bens et al., 2003; Hribar et al., 2006).
Following the methodology used by Hribar et al. (2006) and Almeida et al. (2016),
we define a fiscal quarter as EPS-motivated share repurchase quarter (EPS REP = 1)
when the frim would have a stagnant or declining EPS without the repurchase in the
fiscal quarter. Suppose that shares are repurchased at a price P per share using cash that
was previously earning an after-tax return r per period. A fiscal quarter is considered
EPS-motivated repurchase quarter only when the inverse price-to-earnings ratio at the





For example, if a firm earns 3% after taxes on cash, stock repurchases are EPS-
motivated only when the price-to-earnings ratio at the time of the buyback is less than
33.3; i.e., the earnings-to-price ratio is above 3%. A repurchase occurring at any higher
PE ratio will actually reduce EPS for this firm because the cost of the repurchase will
outweigh the reduction in shares outstanding.
3.2. Stock Price Crash Risk
3.2.1. Ex-post Stock Price Crash Risk
Following Chen et al. (2001), we use the negative skewness of firm-specific daily returns
over the fiscal quarter (Negative Skewness) as our first measure of stock price crash risk.
Specifically, we calculate Negative Skewness for a given firm in a fiscal by taking the
negative of the third moment of firm-specific daily returns for each sample quarter and
dividing it by the standard deviation of firm-specific daily returns raised to the third











Following Kim et al. (2011), our second measure of stock price crash risk is the
number of negative extreme return days over a fiscal quarter. A firm-specific daily return
3.2 standard deviations below the mean firm-specific daily return over the fiscal quarter
is considered negative extreme, with 3.2 chosen to generate a frequency of 0.1% in the
normal distribution.
3.2.2. Expected Stock Price Crash Risk
The steepness of the options implied voaltility skew curve has been widely used as a
proxy of investors’ expected crash risk. Consistent with existing studies (Bollen and
37
Whaley, 2004; Xing et al., 2010; Van Buskirk, 2011; Kim and Zhang, 2014; Kim et al.,
2016; Kim et al., 2019), this paper measures the implied volatility skew (IV Skewi,t) of
stock i’s option as the difference between the implied volatility of an OTM put on day t
(IV OTMPi,t ) and that of an ATM call (IV
ATMC
i,t ) on the same day:
IV Skewi,t = IV
OTMP
i,t − IV ATMCi,t (6)
When there are multiple put or call option contracts for stock i on a particular day t,
we calculate the weighted average of the implied volatilities for the put or call options,
using the option open interest (OPEN INT) as weight:
IV Skewi,t =
∑




k Open INTk × IV ATMCi,t,k∑
k Open INTk
(7)
OTM puts are defined as put options with a delta value between 0.375 and 0.125,
and ATM calls are defined as call options with a delta value between 0.375 and 0.625.
We average the daily IV Skewi,t over the 1-quarter period after the fiscal year-end to
calculate quarterly implied volatility skew.
3.3. Stock Liquidity, Institutional Ownership, Analyst Coverage, and Con-
trol Variables
Following Brockman et al. (2008), we use stock turnover (Stock Turnover) to measure
stock liquidity. Stock turnover is calculated as the average daily stock turnover over
the fiscal quarter. Institutional ownership (Institution Ownership) is the proportion of
stocks of the firm owned by institutional investors. Following Kim et al. (2019), to
isolate the effect of EPS-motivated share repurchase on expected crash risk from the
effect of other factors, we include several firm-specific controls, including the ATM im-
plied volatility level (ATM IV), firm size (Size), firm leverage (Leverage), market-to-book
ratio (MB), earnings volatility (Earnings VOL), cash flow volatility (Cash VOL), sales
volatility (Sales VOL), market beta (Beta), volatility of stock returns (Total VOL), id-
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iosyncratic volatility of stock returns (Idiosyncratic VOL), and quarterly stock returns
(RET).
Following Schmidt and Fahlenbrach (2017), we collect information of quarterly insti-
tutional ownership from Thomas Reuters 13F. The institutional investors include invest-
ment advisers, banks, insurance companies, broker-dealers, pension funds, and corpora-
tions. Following Yu (2008), we calculate the number of analysts following a company
from IBES.
Firm size is the log of the market value of equity. Firm leverage is total long-term debt
divided by total assets. Earnings volatility is the standard deviation of earnings before
extraordinary items (scaled by total assets) over the past 20 quarters. Cash volatility is
the standard deviation of operating cash flows (scaled by total assets) over the past 20
quarters. Sales volatility is the standard deviation of sales revenue (scaled by total assets)
over the past 20 quarters. Market beta is estimated using daily stock and market returns
over the fiscal quarter. Idiosyncratic volatility is standard deviation of firm-specific daily
returns over the fiscal quarter. Firm-specific daily return is estimated using Fama French
4 Factor model.
3.4. Sample
The sample period is from year 1996 to 2018. We collect daily option data (including
delta, opening interest, and implied volatility) from OptionMetrics’ Ivy DB, daily stock
return data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), and quarterly
financial data from Compustat. Consistent with Kim and Zhang (2019), we apply various
filters for OptionMetrics including: (i) the implied volatility of the option is not missing
and is between 0.03 and 2.00; (ii) the open interest of the option is not missing and is
greater than zero; (iii) the total volume of option contracts is not missing; (iv) the best
offer price is equal or greater than the best bid price and the best bid price is not zero;
(v) at least 60 trading days are available within the fiscal year; and (vi) the value of
the option delta is between 0.375 and 0.625 for call option or between 0.375 and 0.125
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for put option. We apply filters for Compustat and the CRSP, including: (i) the book
value of total assets and the book value of equity are greater than zero; (ii) the year-end
share price is greater than $1; (iii) the SIC code is not missing and is not between 6000
and 6999 (the financial industry is excluded); and (iv) the CRSP daily price and volume
data are available for at least six months during the fiscal year period. Following Kim et
al. (2019), we require all firm quarters in our sample to have non-missing information of
institutional holdings and analyst coverage.
According to the summary statistics of Table 17, 0.5 percent of the firm quarters in
the sample are identified as an EPS-motivated share repurchase quarter. An average
firm buys back 0.6 percent of shares outstanding per fiscal quarter (2.4 percent per fiscal
year). The mean Negative Skewness is about -0.19 and, on average, 0.273 trading day
has firm-specific daily return below 3.2 standard deviations from its mean over the fiscal
quarter. The mean implied volatility skew is 0.044, suggesting that investors, on average,
have a positive expected crash risk. A typical firm in the sample turns over all shares
outstanding by about 10 times per fiscal quarter (about 40 times per year). On average,
about 70% of common shares in the sample are held by institutional investors, and an
average firm has about ten covering analysts.
4. Empirical Results
4.1. Effects of EPS-motivated Share Repurchase on Stock Price Crash Risk
We start by testing the effects of EPS-motivated share repurchase on stock price crash
risk. The ex-post stock price crash risk is measured byNegative Skewness and Extreme ND.
The baseline empirical model regresses Negative Skewness and Extreme ND on three
explanatory variables, including the indicator of EPS-motivated repurchase quarter (EPS REP ),
amount of actual share repurchase (REP ), and their interaction term. The interac-
tion term EPS REP × REP measures the amount of EPS-motivated share repur-
chase. The coefficient β1 indicates the association between the amount of EPS-motivated
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share repurchase and stock price crash risk that is proxied by Negative Skewness and
Extreme ND. We specify the regression equation:





thControlV ariablesi,t−1) + εi + θt





thControlV ariablesi,t−1) + εi + θt (8)
According to the results in the first row of Table 18, the amount of EPS-motivated
share repurchase has weak effects on Negative Skewness and no effect on Extreme ND.
This evidence suggests that when managers use share repurchase to boost EPS, that will
not affect the ex-post stock price crash risk.
4.2. Effects of EPS-motivated Share Repurchase on Expected Stock Price
Crash Risk
We continue to test the effects of EPS-motivated share repurchase on expected stock
price crash risk. The expected stock price crash risk is measured by IV Skew. The
baseline empirical model regresses IV Skew on three explanatory variables, including
the indicator of EPS-motivated repurchase quarter (EPS REP ), amount of actual share
repurchase (REP ), and their interaction term. The interaction term EPS REP ×REP
measures the amount of EPS-motivated share repurchase. The coefficient β1 indicates
the association between the amount of EPS-motivated share repurchase and stock price
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crash risk that is proxied by IV Skew. We specify the regression equation:




thControlV ariablesi,t−1) + εi + θt (9)
According to the results in the first row of Table 19, the coefficient β1 remains sig-
nificant and positive for all four specifications, suggesting that EPS-motivated share
repurchase significantly increases investors’ perceived stock price crash risk. Moreover,
the results of β1 in the third row of Table 19 show that the amount of total share re-
purchase significantly reduces expected crash risk. This evidence is consistent with the
notion that share repurchase can provide price support to stocks, thus lowering the crash
risk (Liu and Swanson, 2016). Large firms, on average, tend to have lower expected crash
risk. This should be no surprise because large firms tend to hold more diversified assets
than small firms, and investors perceive large firms as being safer than small firms (Fama
and French, 1992). Highly leveraged firms are associated with high expected crash risk.
Firm leverage increases financial risk and hence increases expected crash risk (Myers,
1984). Moreover, the results show that the total volatility of stock returns increases
expected crash risk, while the idiosyncratic volatility reduces expected crash risk. One
possible explanation is that idiosyncratic volatility may offer certain degrees of insurance
against crash risk and hence lowers investors’ perception of crash risk (Chen and Petkova,
2012). The inclusion of various control factors does not change the sign and significance
of the coefficient of the interaction term EPS REP × REP . The results in Table 19
partially support our first hypothesis that share repurchase reduces expected crash risk
while EPS-motivated share repurchase increases expected crash risk.
Since the identification of EPS-motivated share repurchase is not straightforward,
investors may underreact to this information (Kadiyala and Rau, 2004). We not only test
whether EPS-motivated share repurchase affects expected crash risk but also test whether
investors underreact to the use of EPS-motivated share repurchase by managers. Building
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on our previous analysis in Table 19, we test whether the amount of EPS-motivated
share repurchase has persistent effects on the stock price crash risk in the following four
fiscal quarters. Table 20 presents the results of the panel regressions that examine how
EPS-motivated share repurchase affects future expected crash risk. We measure future
expected crash risk by IV Skew in 1-4 quarters following the current fiscal quarter. The
coefficient of the interaction term EPS REP ×REP remains significant and positive for
all quarters, suggesting that EPS-motivated share repurchase has long-lasting impacts on
the expected crash risk. One possible explanation of this evidence is that investors may
underreact to the use of EPS-motivated repurchase by managers. Such underreaction
may be caused by the time needed to process the information of share repurchase and
identify the use of EPS-motivated repurchase.
4.3. Effects of Stock Liquidity on Expected Stock Price Crash Risk Induced
by EPS-motivated Share Repurchase
Since stock liquidity is an important factor for repurchase decisions (Brockman et al.,
2008), we continue to test the interplay between stock liquidity and EPS-motivated share
repurchase and its effects on expected crash risk. Based on the regression specification
in Equation 9, we include another interaction term to test the impacts of stock liquidity
(measured by Stock Turnover):
IV Skewi,t = β1EPS REPi,t−1 ×REPi,t−1 × Stock Turnoveri,t−1+
β2EPS REPi,t−1 ×REPi,t−1 + β3Stock Turnoveri,t−1+
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β1 measures the effects of stock liquidity on the EPS-motivated share repurchase
- expected crash risk association. According to the results in Table 21, the interaction
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term EPS REP×REP still has significant positive effects on expected crash risk, which
confirms the results of Table 20. Moreover, β1 has a significant and positive coefficient
for all specifications. This evidence suggests that stock liquidity strengthens the EPS-
motivated share repurchase - expected crash risk association. Higher stock liquidity
encourages the use of EPS-motivated share repurchase and hence further increases the
expected crash risk. This evidence is consistent with the findings of Brockman et al.
(2008) that higher stock liquidity leads to lower costs of share repurchase.
We further test whether the impacts of stock liquidity on the predictive power of EPS-
motivated share repurchase on future expected crash risk can persist beyond the current
fiscal quarter. The results in Table 22 confirm that the positive association between EPS-
motivated share repurchase and future expected crash risk is more pronounced among
firms with higher stock liquidity. Overall, the results in Table 21 and Table 22 support
our second hypothesis that higher stock liquidity encourages the use of EPS-motivated
share repurchase and hence increases expected crash risk.
4.4. Effects of Corporate Governance on Expected Stock Price Crash Risk
Induced by EPS-motivated Share Repurchase
In this section, we continue to test the interplay between corporate governance and EPS-
motivated share repurchase and its effects on expected crash risk. Based on the regression
specification in Equation 9, we include another interaction term to test the impacts of
corporate governance (measured by Institution Ownership):
IV Skewi,t = β1EPS REPi,t−1 ×REPi,t−1 × Institution Ownershipi,t−1+
β2EPS REPi,t−1 ×REPi,t−1 + β3Institution Ownershipi,t−1+




thControlV ariablesi,t−1) + εi + θt (11)
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The coefficient of interest is β1 for this regression model since it measures the change in
expected crash risk for a one-unit change in the interplay between institutional ownership
and EPS-motivated share repurchase. According to the results in Table 23, institutional
ownership has weak impacts on the EPS-motivated share repurchase - expected crash
risk association.
We further examine the effects of institutional ownership on the expected crash risk
induced by EPS-motivated share repurchase. The results in Table 24 suggest that insti-
tutional ownership does not have significant impacts on the EPS-motivated share repur-
chase - expected crash risk association in the four quarters following the current fiscal
quarter.
We further test the interplay between corporate governance and EPS-motivated share
repurchase and its effects on expected crash risk using an alternative measure of corporate
governance. Based on the regression specification in Equation 9, we include another
interaction term to test the impacts of stock liquidity (measured by Analyst):
IV Skewi,t = β1EPS REPi,t−1 ×REPi,t−1 × Analysti,t−1+
β2EPS REPi,t−1 ×REPi,t−1 + β3Analysti,t−1+




thControlV ariablesi,t−1) + εi + θt (12)
β1 measures the effects of analyst coverage on the EPS-motivated share repurchase
- expected crash risk association. According to the results in Table 25, the interaction
term EPS REP×REP still has significant positive effects on expected crash risk, which
confirms the results of Table 20. Moreover, β1 has a significant and negative coefficient
for all specifications. This evidence suggests that analyst coverage weakens the EPS-
motivated share repurchase - expected crash risk association. Higher analyst coverage
disciplines managers from using EPS-motivated share repurchase and hence reduces the
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expected crash risk. This evidence is consistent with the findings of Yu (2008) that firms
followed by more analysts manage their earnings less.
We further test whether the impacts of analyst coverage on the predictive power of
EPS-motivated share repurchase on future expected crash risk can persist beyond the cur-
rent fiscal quarter. The results in Table 26 confirm that the positive association between
EPS-motivated share repurchase and future expected crash risk is less pronounced among
firms with higher analyst coverage. Overall, the results in Table 25 and Table 26 support
our third hypothesis that higher analyst coverage reduces the use of EPS-motivated share
repurchase and hence reduces expected crash risk.
5. Conclusion
We find that EPS-motivated share repurchase positively relates to expected crash risk,
which is measured by implied volatility skew in the options market. Additionally, EPS-
motivated repurchase predicts significantly higher expected crash risk in 1-4 quarters
after the current fiscal quarter. We also study the interplay between EPS-motivated
share repurchase and stock liquidity and its impacts on expected crash risk. Consistent
with the findings of Brockman et al. (2008), we find that higher stock liquidity encourages
managers to use share repurchase to manipulate EPS and hence increases expected crash
risk. Besides, this paper studies the role of corporate governance in the EPS-motivated
share repurchase - expected crash risk relation and find that corporate governance, prox-
ied by institutional ownership and analyst coverage, significantly reduces the expected
crash risk induced by EPS-motivated repurchase. This evidence suggests that corporate
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Figure 1: Number of Repurchase Firms and Aggregate Stock and Options Volumes
This figure shows the number of repurchase firms (Panel A), aggregate stock market trading volume
(Panel B), and aggregate options market trading volume (Panel C) from 1996 to 2017. I follow
Banyi et al. (2008) to consider firms that buy back more than 1% of total shares in a given quarter
as repurchase firms. Aggregate stock market trading volume is the sum of trading volumes of
all the stocks in my sample, and aggregate options market trading volume is the sum of trading
volumes of all the options in my sample. The firms in the sample are publicly traded US operating
firms excluding financials and utilities with options volume information available for at least four
consecutive quarters.
56
Figure 2: Stock and Options Volumes in Repurchase versus Non-repurchase Quarters
This figure compares the STOCKVOL and OPTIONVOL in repurchase and non-repurchase quarters.
STOCKVOL (OPTIONVOL) is the natural log of stock (options) trading volume. REPDUM is a
dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm buys back more than 1% of its total shares in a given
quarter and equals 0 otherwise. I follow Banyi et al. (2008) to define quarters with REPDUM equal
to 1 as repurchase quarters and quarters with REPDUM equal to 0 as non-repurchase quarters to
account for preferred buybacks. Panel A compares the distribution of STOCKVOL in repurchase and
non-repurchase quarters; Panel B compares the distribution of OPTIONVOL in repurchase and non-
repurchase quarters. Panel C shows boxplots comparing the quintiles of STOCKVOL in repurchase
and non-repurchase quarters; Panel D shows boxplots comparing the quintiles of OPTIONVOL in
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 17: Descriptive Statistics
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the main variables of this paper. Negative Skewness
is the negative skewness of firm-specific daily returns over the fiscal quarter. Extreme ND is the
number of days with negative extreme firm-specific daily returns over the fiscal quarter. A firm-
specific daily return 3.2 standard deviations below the mean firm-specific daily return over the
fiscal quarter is considered negative extreme. IV Skew is the average daily implied volatility skew
over the fiscal quarter, where the daily implied volatility skew is the difference between the implied
volatility of OTM put options and that of ATM call options. EPS REP is a dummy variable that
equals 1 if the firm would have an EPS lower than the previous quarter without the share repurchase
and 0 otherwise. REP is the amount of quarterly actual share repurchase scaled by total assets.
Stock Turnover is the average daily stock turnover over the fiscal quarter. Institution Ownership
is the proportion of stocks of the firm owned by institutional investors. Analyst is the number
of analysts following a stock. Size is the log of the market value of equity. Leverage is the total
long-term debt divided by total assets. MB is the market value of equity divided by total assets.
Earnings VOL is the the standard deviation of earnings before extraordinary items (scaled by
total assets) over the past 20 quarters. Cash VOL is the standard deviation of operating cash
flows (scaled by total assets) over the past 20 quarters. Sales VOL is the standard deviation
of sales revenue (scaled by total assets) over the past 20 quarters. Beta is the market beta for
the firm. RET is the quarterly stock return over the fiscal quarter. Total VOL is the standard
deviation of daily stock returns over the fiscal quarter. Idiosyncratic VOL is the standard deviation
of firm-specific daily returns over the fiscal quarter. All variables are winsorized at the 1% and
99% levels.
Mean Std.Dev Min Q1 Median Q3 Max Skewness
Analyst 10.846 7.259 1.000 5.000 9.000 15.000 51.000 1.037
Beta 1.061 0.474 -21.016 0.783 1.031 1.309 8.127 -0.134
Cash VOL 0.018 0.071 0.000 0.006 0.011 0.020 5.965 70.646
Earnings VOL 0.024 0.123 0.000 0.006 0.011 0.024 8.415 51.052
EPS REP 0.005 0.072 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 13.796
Extreme ND 0.273 0.470 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 3.000 1.344
Idiosyncratic VOL 0.020 0.012 0.001 0.012 0.017 0.026 0.241 1.871
Institution Ownership 0.706 0.231 0.001 0.607 0.764 0.875 0.992 -1.330
IV Skew 0.044 0.035 -0.068 0.025 0.038 0.056 0.261 1.643
Leverage 0.182 0.170 0.000 0.019 0.155 0.292 1.495 0.883
MB 3.596 3.604 0.441 1.578 2.492 4.146 34.417 3.460
Negative Skewness -0.190 1.422 -7.442 -0.733 -0.168 0.355 6.935 -0.051
REP 0.006 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.092 3.171
RET 0.031 0.204 -0.564 -0.087 0.026 0.139 0.855 0.341
Sales VOL 0.049 0.063 0.000 0.017 0.034 0.060 2.475 9.226
Size 7.852 1.654 2.708 6.623 7.711 8.962 13.886 0.389
Stock Turnover 9.901 7.024 1.502 5.199 7.917 12.299 50.789 1.987
Total VOL 0.025 0.014 0.001 0.015 0.022 0.031 0.201 1.799
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Table 18: Effects of EPS-motivated Share Repurchase on Stock Price Crash Risk
This table presents results from panel regressions that examine how EPS-motivated share repur-
chase affects stock price crash risk. EPS-motivated share repurchase is measured by the interac-
tion term of ESP REP and REP. Crash risk is measured by Negative Skewness and Extreme ND.
EPS REP is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm would have an EPS lower than the previ-
ous quarter without the share repurchase and 0 otherwise. REP is the amount of quarterly actual
share repurchase scaled by total assets. Negative Skewness is the negative skewness of firm-specific
daily returns over the fiscal quarter. Extreme ND is the number of days with negative extreme
firm-specific daily returns over the fiscal quarter. Please see Table 1 for the definition of the control
variables. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable:
Negative Skewness Extreme ND
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
EPS REP × REP −0.240 −0.523∗ −0.563∗ −0.288 0.018 −0.054 −0.035 −0.141
(0.282) (0.283) (0.304) (0.280) (0.091) (0.092) (0.099) (0.093)
EPS REP −0.062 −0.057 −0.048 0.023 0.007 0.009 −0.005 −0.002
(0.055) (0.055) (0.059) (0.055) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018)
REP 9.761∗∗∗ 10.287∗∗∗ 10.703∗∗∗ 7.198∗∗∗ 2.577∗∗∗ 2.708∗∗∗ 2.800∗∗∗ 2.009∗∗∗
(0.326) (0.328) (0.342) (0.316) (0.106) (0.107) (0.111) (0.105)
Size −0.226∗∗∗ −0.230∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗ −0.064∗∗∗ −0.066∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Leverage −0.075 −0.051 0.066 −0.006 −0.001 0.014
(0.046) (0.049) (0.045) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015)
MB 0.021 0.023 0.017 0.008 0.008 0.005
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Earnings VOL −0.264∗∗ 0.008 −0.086∗∗ −0.003
(0.117) (0.108) (0.038) (0.036)
Cash VOL 0.338∗ −0.028 0.161∗∗∗ 0.024
(0.183) (0.169) (0.060) (0.056)
Sales VOL 0.367∗∗∗ 0.511∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.026





Total VOL −12.675∗∗∗ −15.000∗∗∗
(1.047) (0.350)
Idiosyncratic VOL 7.735∗∗∗ 27.151∗∗∗
(1.250) (0.417)
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 152,070 150,746 134,238 134,238 152,104 150,780 134,260 134,238
Adjusted R2 0.048 0.053 0.052 0.198 0.060 0.064 0.063 0.167
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Table 19: Effects of EPS-motivated Share Repurchase on Expected Stock Price Crash Risk
This table presents results from panel regressions that examine how EPS-motivated share repur-
chase affects expected stock price crash risk. EPS-motivated share repurchase is measured by the
interaction term of ESP REP and REP. Expected stock price crash risk is measured by IV Skew.
EPS REP is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm would have an EPS lower than the previ-
ous quarter without the share repurchase and 0 otherwise. REP is the amount of quarterly actual
share repurchase scaled by total assets. IV Skew is the average daily implied volatility skew over
the fiscal quarter, where the daily implied volatility skew is the difference between the implied
volatility of OTM put options and that of ATM call options. Please see Table 1 for the defini-




(1) (2) (3) (4)
EPS REP × REP 13.611∗∗∗ 12.819∗∗∗ 12.644∗∗∗ 11.071∗∗∗
(0.554) (0.555) (0.578) (0.564)
EPS REP 0.200∗ 0.196∗ 0.198∗ 0.159
(0.107) (0.107) (0.113) (0.110)
REP −7.959∗∗∗ −6.907∗∗∗ −5.966∗∗∗ −4.344∗∗∗
(0.640) (0.644) (0.650) (0.636)
Size −0.339∗∗∗ −0.362∗∗∗ −0.258∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
Leverage 1.479∗∗∗ 1.501∗∗∗ 1.317∗∗∗
(0.090) (0.093) (0.090)
MB 0.044 0.042 0.040
(0.034) (0.033) (0.032)
Earnings VOL −0.597∗∗∗ −0.481∗∗
(0.223) (0.217)
Cash VOL 2.621∗∗∗ 2.277∗∗∗
(0.349) (0.340)










Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 152,104 150,780 134,260 134,238
Adjusted R2 0.342 0.347 0.345 0.378
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Table 20: Effects of EPS-motivated Share Repurchase on Future Expected Stock Price Crash Risk
This table presents results from panel regressions that examine how EPS-motivated share repur-
chase affects future expected stock price crash risk. EPS-motivated share repurchase is measured
by the interaction term of ESP REP and REP. Future expected crash risk is measured by IV Skew
in 1-4 quarters after the current fiscal quarter. EPS REP is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the
firm would have an EPS lower than the previous quarter without the share repurchase and 0 oth-
erwise. REP is the amount of quarterly actual share repurchase scaled by total assets. IV Skew is
the average daily implied volatility skew over the fiscal quarter, where the daily implied volatility
skew is the difference between the implied volatility of OTM put options and that of ATM call
options. Please see Table 1 for the definition of the control variables. *, **, and *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable:
IV Skew[quarter 1] IV Skew[quarter 2] IV Skew[quarter 3] IV Skew[quarter 4]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EPS REP × REP 7.901∗∗∗ 5.830∗∗∗ 3.110∗∗∗ 2.523∗∗∗
(0.710) (0.782) (0.813) (0.826)
EPS REP −0.151 −0.158 −0.204 −0.394∗∗
(0.140) (0.154) (0.159) (0.161)
REP −4.318∗∗∗ −4.223∗∗∗ −6.264∗∗∗ −6.018∗∗∗
(0.800) (0.878) (0.908) (0.921)
Size −0.272∗∗∗ −0.271∗∗∗ −0.256∗∗∗ −0.215∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025)
Leverage 1.445∗∗∗ 1.430∗∗∗ 1.280∗∗∗ 1.245∗∗∗
(0.114) (0.125) (0.130) (0.133)
MB −0.025 −0.020 −0.014 0.124
(0.040) (0.044) (0.048) (0.221)
Earnings VOL −0.269 −0.416 −2.591∗∗∗ −3.444∗∗∗
(0.277) (0.310) (0.351) (0.355)
Cash VOL 2.267∗∗∗ 2.755∗∗∗ 6.161∗∗∗ 6.788∗∗∗
(0.431) (0.479) (0.530) (0.536)
Sales VOL 0.800∗∗∗ 0.554∗ −0.005 −0.144
(0.272) (0.299) (0.310) (0.316)
Beta −0.150∗∗∗ −0.075∗∗∗ −0.017 0.028
(0.025) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028)
RET 0.248∗∗∗ 0.053 −0.053 −0.064
(0.045) (0.050) (0.052) (0.053)
Total VOL 111.454∗∗∗ 83.077∗∗∗ 54.128∗∗∗ 35.195∗∗∗
(2.653) (2.913) (3.007) (3.045)
Idiosyncratic VOL −75.548∗∗∗ −52.105∗∗∗ −21.501∗∗∗ −4.194
(3.173) (3.498) (3.622) (3.677)
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 132,488 130,536 128,346 126,030
Adjusted R2 0.286 0.274 0.276 0.273
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Table 21: Effects of Stock Liquidity on Expected Stock Price Crash Risk Induced by EPS-motivated
Share Repurchase
This table presents results from panel regressions that examine how stock liquidity affects expected
crash risk induced by EPS-motivated share repurchase. EPS-motivated share repurchase is mea-
sured by the interaction term of ESP REP and REP. Expected crash risk is measured by IV Skew.
Stock liquidity is measured by Stock Turnover. EPS REP is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the
firm would have an EPS lower than the previous quarter without the share repurchase and 0 oth-
erwise. REP is the amount of quarterly actual share repurchase scaled by total assets. IV Skew is
the average daily implied volatility skew over the fiscal quarter, where the daily implied volatility
skew is the difference between the implied volatility of OTM put options and that of ATM call
options. Stock Turnover is the average daily stock turnover over the fiscal quarter. Please see
Table 1 for the definition of the control variables. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable:
IV Skew
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EPS REP × REP × Stock Turnover 0.393∗∗∗ 0.351∗∗∗ 0.481∗∗∗ 0.423∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.060) (0.064) (0.063)
EPS REP × REP 8.365∗∗∗ 8.050∗∗∗ 6.714∗∗∗ 6.539∗∗∗
(0.838) (0.838) (0.863) (0.847)
Stock Turnover −2.181∗∗∗ −1.944∗∗∗ −2.682∗∗∗ −2.389∗∗∗
(0.342) (0.342) (0.367) (0.360)
EPS REP 0.127 0.123 0.116 0.126
(0.107) (0.107) (0.112) (0.110)
REP −7.742∗∗∗ −6.710∗∗∗ −5.961∗∗∗ −4.412∗∗∗
(0.636) (0.640) (0.646) (0.635)
Size −0.356∗∗∗ −0.363∗∗∗ −0.292∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
Leverage 1.258∗∗∗ 1.276∗∗∗ 1.232∗∗∗
(0.089) (0.092) (0.090)
MB 0.042 0.040 0.040
(0.034) (0.033) (0.032)
Earnings VOL −0.576∗∗∗ −0.492∗∗
(0.221) (0.217)
Cash VOL 2.329∗∗∗ 2.194∗∗∗
(0.346) (0.340)










Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 152,104 150,780 134,260 134,238
Adjusted R2 0.350 0.355 0.355 0.379
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Table 22: Effects of Stock Liquidity on Future Expected Stock Price Crash Risk Induced by EPS-
motivated Share Repurchase
This table presents results from panel regressions that examine how stock liquidity affects future
expected crash risk induced by EPS-motivated share repurchase. EPS-motivated share repurchase
is measured by the interaction term of ESP REP and REP. Future expected crash risk is mea-
sured by IV Skew in 1-4 quarters after the current fiscal quarter. Stock liquidity is measured by
Stock Turnover. EPS REP is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm would have an EPS lower
than the previous quarter without the share repurchase and 0 otherwise. REP is the amount of
quarterly actual share repurchase scaled by total assets. IV Skew is the average daily implied
volatility skew over the fiscal quarter, where the daily implied volatility skew is the difference be-
tween the implied volatility of OTM put options and that of ATM call options. Stock Turnover is
the average daily stock turnover over the fiscal quarter. Please see Table 1 for the definition of the
control variables. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable:
IV Skew[quarter 1] IV Skew[quarter 2] IV Skew[quarter 3] IV Skew[quarter 4]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EPS REP × REP × Stock Turnover 0.632∗∗∗ 0.471∗∗∗ 0.706∗∗∗ 0.419∗∗∗
(0.075) (0.083) (0.091) (0.092)
EPS REP × REP 2.421∗∗ 1.317 −4.091∗∗∗ −2.174∗
(1.054) (1.162) (1.222) (1.240)
Stock Turnover −3.549∗∗∗ −2.629∗∗∗ −3.972∗∗∗ −2.352∗∗∗
(0.430) (0.474) (0.518) (0.526)
EPS REP −0.078 0.059 −0.263∗ −0.439∗∗∗
(0.135) (0.149) (0.159) (0.161)
REP −7.380∗∗∗ −5.535∗∗∗ −6.812∗∗∗ −6.143∗∗∗
(0.800) (0.884) (0.906) (0.920)
Size −0.379∗∗∗ −0.380∗∗∗ −0.269∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.024) (0.025)
Leverage 1.295∗∗∗ 1.151∗∗∗ 1.117∗∗∗
(0.124) (0.130) (0.133)
MB −0.020 −0.013 0.139
(0.047) (0.048) (0.221)
Earnings VOL −2.667∗∗∗ −3.487∗∗∗
(0.351) (0.355)
Cash VOL 6.114∗∗∗ 6.699∗∗∗
(0.530) (0.536)










Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 150,053 146,451 128,368 126,030
Adjusted R2 0.271 0.275 0.275 0.275
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Table 23: Effects of Institutional Ownership on Expected Stock Price Crash Risk Induced by EPS-
motivated Share Repurchase
This table presents results from panel regressions that examine how institutional ownership affects
expected crash risk induced by EPS-motivated share repurchase. EPS-motivated share repurchase
is measured by the interaction term of ESP REP and REP. Expected crash risk is measured by
IV Skew. EPS REP is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm would have an EPS lower than the
previous quarter without the share repurchase and 0 otherwise. REP is the amount of quarterly
actual share repurchase scaled by total assets. IV Skew is the average daily implied volatility
skew over the fiscal quarter, where the daily implied volatility skew is the difference between the
implied volatility of OTM put options and that of ATM call options. Institution Ownership is
the proportion of stocks of the firm owned by institutional investors. Please see Table 1 for the




(1) (2) (3) (4)
EPS REP × REP × Institution Ownership -1.991∗ -1.400∗ -2.882∗∗ -0.747∗
(2.219) (2.224) (2.369) (2.310)
EPS REP × REP 12.299∗∗∗ 11.925∗∗∗ 10.793∗∗∗ 10.603∗∗∗
(1.511) (1.516) (1.632) (1.591)
Institution Ownership −11.837 −8.096 −16.345 −3.892
(12.691) (12.720) (13.553) (13.213)
EPS REP 0.201∗ 0.196∗ 0.199∗ 0.160
(0.107) (0.107) (0.113) (0.110)
REP −8.009∗∗∗ −6.923∗∗∗ −5.934∗∗∗ −4.257∗∗∗
(0.641) (0.645) (0.651) (0.636)
Size −0.336∗∗∗ −0.366∗∗∗ −0.269∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
Leverage 1.479∗∗∗ 1.501∗∗∗ 1.318∗∗∗
(0.090) (0.093) (0.090)
MB 0.044 0.041 0.038
(0.034) (0.033) (0.032)
Earnings VOL −0.588∗∗∗ −0.465∗∗
(0.223) (0.217)
Cash VOL 2.608∗∗∗ 2.255∗∗∗
(0.349) (0.340)










Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 152,104 150,780 134,260 134,238
Adjusted R2 0.342 0.347 0.345 0.378
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Table 24: Effects of Institutional Ownership on Future Expected Stock Price Crash Risk Induced
by EPS-motivated Share Repurchase
This table presents results from panel regressions that examine how institutional ownership affects
future expected crash risk induced by EPS-motivated share repurchase. EPS-motivated share
repurchase is measured by the interaction term of ESP REP and REP. Future expected crash risk
is measured by IV Skew in 1-4 quarters after the current fiscal quarter. EPS REP is a dummy
variable that equals 1 if the firm would have an EPS lower than the previous quarter without
the share repurchase and 0 otherwise. REP is the amount of quarterly actual share repurchase
scaled by total assets. IV Skew is the average daily implied volatility skew over the fiscal quarter,
where the daily implied volatility skew is the difference between the implied volatility of OTM put
options and that of ATM call options. Institution Ownership is the proportion of stocks of the
firm owned by institutional investors. Please see Table 1 for the definition of the control variables.
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable:
IV Skew[quarter 1] IV Skew[quarter 2] IV Skew[quarter 3] IV Skew[quarter 4]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EPS REP × REP × Institution Ownership 1.162 1.377 4.463 3.321
(2.790) (3.086) (3.345) (3.390)
EPS REP × REP 9.473∗∗∗ 6.504∗∗∗ 1.280 0.399
(1.901) (2.105) (2.308) (2.340)
Institution Ownership −6.924 −7.750 −24.998 −18.249
(15.960) (17.651) (19.136) (19.391)
EPS REP 0.005 0.134 −0.172 −0.393∗∗
(0.136) (0.150) (0.160) (0.161)
REP −7.642∗∗∗ −5.694∗∗∗ −6.688∗∗∗ −5.832∗∗∗
(0.804) (0.888) (0.909) (0.922)
Size −0.369∗∗∗ −0.397∗∗∗ −0.235∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.024) (0.026)
Leverage 1.516∗∗∗ 1.375∗∗∗ 1.248∗∗∗
(0.124) (0.130) (0.133)
MB −0.019 −0.017 0.119
(0.047) (0.048) (0.221)
Earnings VOL −2.628∗∗∗ −3.412∗∗∗
(0.352) (0.355)
Cash VOL 6.319∗∗∗ 6.744∗∗∗
(0.532) (0.536)










Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 150,053 146,451 128,368 126,030
Adjusted R2 0.265 0.270 0.270 0.273
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Table 25: Effects of Analyst Coverage on Expected Stock Price Crash Risk Induced by EPS-
motivated Share Repurchase
This table presents results from panel regressions that examine how analyst coverage affects ex-
pected crash risk induced by EPS-motivated share repurchase. EPS-motivated share repurchase
is measured by the interaction term of ESP REP and REP. Expected crash risk is measured by
IV Skew. EPS REP is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm would have an EPS lower than
the previous quarter without the share repurchase and 0 otherwise. REP is the amount of quar-
terly actual share repurchase scaled by total assets. IV Skew is the average daily implied volatility
skew over the fiscal quarter, where the daily implied volatility skew is the difference between the
implied volatility of OTM put options and that of ATM call options. Analyst is number of analysts
following a stock. Please see Table 1 for the definition of the control variables. *, **, and ***
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable:
IV Skew
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EPS REP × REP × Analyst -1.064∗∗∗ -1.028∗∗∗ -0.904∗∗∗ -0.762∗∗∗
(0.092) (0.092) (0.098) (0.095)
EPS REP × REP 5.448∗∗∗ 5.038∗∗∗ 5.736∗∗∗ 5.183∗∗∗
(0.901) (0.904) (0.939) (0.915)
Analyst −6.101∗∗∗ −5.881∗∗∗ −5.175∗∗∗ −4.361∗∗∗
(0.523) (0.528) (0.560) (0.546)
EPS REP 0.197∗ 0.187∗ 0.188∗ 0.156
(0.107) (0.107) (0.113) (0.110)
REP −7.434∗∗∗ −6.698∗∗∗ −5.812∗∗∗ −4.224∗∗∗
(0.640) (0.643) (0.648) (0.633)
Size −0.319∗∗∗ −0.337∗∗∗ −0.232∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
Leverage 1.456∗∗∗ 1.491∗∗∗ 1.302∗∗∗
(0.090) (0.093) (0.090)
MB 0.045 0.043 0.041
(0.034) (0.033) (0.032)
Earnings VOL −0.241 −0.180
(0.246) (0.239)
Cash VOL 3.116∗∗∗ 2.616∗∗∗
(0.401) (0.390)










Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 151,113 149,793 133,333 133,311
Adjusted R2 0.343 0.348 0.346 0.379
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Table 26: Effects of Analyst Coverage on Future Expected Stock Price Crash Risk Induced by
EPS-motivated Share Repurchase
This table presents results from panel regressions that examine how analyst coverage affects future
expected crash risk induced by EPS-motivated share repurchase. EPS-motivated share repurchase
is measured by the interaction term of ESP REP and REP. Future expected crash risk is measured
by IV Skew in 1-4 quarters after the current fiscal quarter. EPS REP is a dummy variable that
equals 1 if the firm would have an EPS lower than the previous quarter without the share repurchase
and 0 otherwise. REP is the amount of quarterly actual share repurchase scaled by total assets.
IV Skew is the average daily implied volatility skew over the fiscal quarter, where the daily implied
volatility skew is the difference between the implied volatility of OTM put options and that of
ATM call options. Analyst is the number of analysts following a stock. Please see Table 1 for the
definition of the control variables. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.
Dependent variable:
IV Skew[quarter 1] IV Skew[quarter 2] IV Skew[quarter 3] IV Skew[quarter 4]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EPS REP × REP × Analyst -1.256∗∗∗ -1.219∗∗∗ -0.951∗∗∗ -0.658∗∗∗
(0.114) (0.127) (0.137) (0.138)
EPS REP × REP 0.214 2.425∗ 3.035∗∗ 2.665∗∗
(1.131) (1.250) (1.327) (1.350)
Analyst −7.196∗∗∗ −6.971∗∗∗ −5.439∗∗∗ −3.763∗∗∗
(0.655) (0.724) (0.781) (0.791)
EPS REP 0.026 0.146 −0.209 −0.410∗∗
(0.135) (0.149) (0.159) (0.161)
REP −7.157∗∗∗ −5.653∗∗∗ −6.644∗∗∗ −5.825∗∗∗
(0.801) (0.884) (0.903) (0.919)
Size −0.358∗∗∗ −0.372∗∗∗ −0.210∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.025) (0.027)
Leverage 1.477∗∗∗ 1.336∗∗∗ 1.242∗∗∗
(0.124) (0.130) (0.133)
MB −0.017 −0.010 0.138
(0.046) (0.048) (0.220)
Earnings VOL −2.032∗∗∗ −3.193∗∗∗
(0.396) (0.401)
Cash VOL 5.111∗∗∗ 6.129∗∗∗
(0.607) (0.615)










Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 149,125 145,590 127,621 125,332
Adjusted R2 0.265 0.271 0.270 0.273
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APPENDICES
Methodogy of Estimating Abnormal Volatility
Denoting the price of the security on quarter t as Pt and that of the market index as




= α + β ∗ lnMt+1
Mt
+ ηt+1, ηt+1 ∼ N(0, ht+1), (13)
ht+1 = a0 + b1 ∗ ht + a1 ∗ η2t . (14)
This model is based on a continuous-time diffusion with mean-reverting volatility.
The vectors of estimated errors ηt and their variances ht are used in the abnormal
volatility estimation, as discussed in the following paragraphs.
Two types of factors determine the level of unsystematic volatility at quarter t of
the event window: security specific (time drift of instantaneous returns, correlation
with the market, long-run volatility mean, etc.) and event specific. Security-specific
factors are independent of the event and are captured by the model for the secu-
rity price process. Because ht+1 in equation (14) depends only on the parameters
governing the price process, it ignores the effect of the event.
We use the parameter λ > 0 to measure the effect of the given event on the
unsystematic volatility of a security’s returns. The parameter λ measures the multiple
by which the unsystematic volatility increases from its no-event level due to the event.
For example, if λ = 1, the event has no effect, whereas if λ = 2, the unsystematic
volatility is doubled. Volatility decreases if λ < 1.
The estimate of λt for quarter t can be obtained by computing the cross-sectional
variance of the standardized GARCH(1,1) residuals in equation (13). If the event
has no effect on the securities’s abnormal volatilities on quarter t, the cross-sectional
variance of the standardized residuals should be equal to 1. The use of cross-sectional
data is justified because the same type of event is af- fecting all securities in the
sample. Additionally, the event effect on a security’s volatility would be hard to
distinguish from noise if only that security’s data were used. Just as in traditional
event study of returns the cross-section is needed to assess the average abnormal
return, it is needed here to assess abnormal volatility.














The estimator of the cumulative abnormal volatility between event quarters k and





(λ̂t − 1) (16)
2003 Modification to SEC Rule 10b-18
The SEC recently amended the stock repurchase safe harbor rule under Rule 10b-18
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which provides an issuer with a safe harbor
from liability for repurchases of its common stock if the issuer complies with the
rule’s manner, timing, price and volume conditions. The amendments to Rule 10b-18
simplify and update the safe harbor provisions to reflect market changes that have
developed since Rule 10b-18’s adoption in 1982, and require more rapid and regular
disclosure of issuer repurchases.
Amendments to Rule 10b-18’s “Safe Harbor”
Amended Rule 10b-18 continues to provide an issuer with a safe harbor from liability
for manipulation of its stock price (under Section 9(a)(2), Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5 of the Exchange Act) when repurchasing its shares in the open market. To qualify
for the safe harbor for any given day, an issuer must satisfy each of the manner,
timing, price and volume conditions of the rule. If an issuer fails to meet any one of
the four conditions, the issuer’s purchases are disqualified from the safe harbor for
that day. Amended Rule 10b-18 expands eligibility for the safe harbor and alters the
timing, price and volume conditions mainly to allow issuers whose securities are less
susceptible to manipulation to stay in the market longer and to repurchase a greater
number of shares during periods of severe market decline.
Definition of Eligible Securities Expanded
The amendment expands the definition of a Rule 10b-18 purchase to include any bid
or limit order that would effect such a purchase, continues to apply to purchases by
or for an issuer or any affiliated purchaser of the issuer, and codifies the position that
the safe harbor is available for repurchases of all common equity securities including
units of beneficial interests in a trust or limited partnership or depository shares.
The amended rule continues to be unavailable for repurchases involving securities
that are not common equity securities, such as preferred stock, warrants, rights, con-
vertible debt securities, options or security futures products, and repurchases effected
in markets outside of the United States.
Price Condition Made Uniform
Prior to these amendments, Rule 10b-18’s price limitations varied depending on the
market for the security. The amended rule applies a uniform price condition regard-
less of where the securities are traded. Under amended Rule 10b-18, issuers may
repurchase their securities at a price that does not exceed the highest independent
bid or the last independent transaction price, whichever is higher, reported in the
consolidated system.
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Volume Limitations Amended to Include Block Repurchases
Prior to these amendments, Rule 10b-18 limited an issuer’ s daily repurchases to a
maximum of 25% of the average daily trading volume of its shares. Because block
purchases were not subject to this volume limitation, and shares repurchased in block
trades were not included in calculating the average daily trading volume, issuers
could make unlimited block repurchases. Under amended Rule10b-18, issuers must
include block repurchases in their calculation of the 25% average daily trading volume
limitation, and can include these block repurchases in calculating the average daily
trading volume for the security, which increases the amount of stock that some issuers
may repurchase within the safe harbor. Amended Rule 10b-18 also allows issuers
to repurchase one block per week, in lieu of complying with the 25% average daily
trading volume limitation, provided that the issuer does not make any other Rule 10b-
18 purchases on that day. However, the issuer may not use the volume increase from
such a block repurchase to increase its 25% average daily trading volume limitation.
Issuers Must Disclose Repurchases in Periodic Reports
An issuer must disclose in its periodic reports all repurchases of equity securities,
regardless of whether the transactions are within the Rule 10b-18 safe harbor. Issuers
are required to disclose, among other things, the total number of shares repurchased,
the average price paid per share, the number of shares repurchased as part of a publicly
announced plan or program, and the maximum number (or approximate dollar value)
of shares that may yet be purchased under the plans or programs. Both open market
and private transactions must be disclosed in a new table required in Item 2(e) of
Forms 10-Q and 10-QSB, Item 5(c) of Forms 10-K and 10-KSB, and in Form 20-F
pursuant to new Item 703 of Regulations S-K and S-B. The table includes required
disclosure of all issuer repurchases of equity securities during its last fiscal quarter.
In addition, an issuer must disclose in footnotes to the table the principal terms of
publicly announced repurchase plans or programs.
Effective Date
Amended Rule 10b-18 became effective on December 17, 2003. The new repurchase
disclosure will be required in reports on Forms 10-Q, 10-QSB, 10-K and 10-KSB filed
for periods ending on or after March 15, 2004 (and in reports on Form 20-F for fiscal




Candidate for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy




Completed the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy in Finance at
Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma in May, 2020.
Completed the requirements for the Bachelor of Science in Finance at
Hunan Normal University, Changsha, China in June, 2011.
Completed the requirements for the Master of Business Administration
at Eastern Illinois University, Charleston, Illinois in May, 2015.
Experience:
Graduate Research and Teaching Assistant
August 2015 - May 2020
